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Executive Summary
Nuclear weapons have not been detonated in violent 
conflict since 1945. The decades since then are commonly 
perceived – particularly in those countries that possess 
nuclear weapons – as an era of successful nuclear non-use 
and a vindication of the framework of nuclear deterrence. 
In this narrative, the fear of massive retaliation and a shared 
understanding and set of behaviours are believed to have 
prevented the use of nuclear weapons. Yet the decades 
since 1945 have been punctuated by a series of disturbing 
close calls. Evidence from many declassified documents, 
testimonies and interviews suggests that the world has, 
indeed, been lucky, given the number of instances in which 
nuclear weapons were nearly used inadvertently as a result 
of miscalculation or error.
A shared belief in nuclear deterrence is not the only 
plausible explanation for this avoidance of nuclear war. 
Rather, individual decision-making, often in disobedience 
of protocol and political guidance, has on several occasions 
saved the day. Whereas the popularized image of the 
‘Moscow–Washington hotline’ gives the illusion that vital 
communication in times of crisis is possible, these incidents 
reveal the reality that those who possess nuclear weapons 
will continue to be distrustful of one another and remain 
reliant on data transmitted by systems that are vulnerable 
to error or misjudgment, particularly when leaders have 
to respond too quickly to be able to make fully informed 
decisions.
Historical cases of near nuclear use resulting from 
misunderstanding demonstrate the importance of the 
‘human judgment factor’ in nuclear decision-making. In 
addition to cases from the Cold War, recent incidents, such 
as the 2009 collision of French and UK submarines, along 
with cases of misconduct in the US Air Force revealed in 
2013, suggest cause for concern regarding current laxity 
in safety and security measures and in command and 
control. Incidents similar to those that have happened in 
the past are likely to happen in the future. A study of cases 
of near nuclear use can thus address a number of important 
questions. What chain of events led to these incidents, and 
what prevented nuclear weapons from being used? How 
might past instances improve assessment of contemporary 
risks? When and how have measures taken in order to 
prevent inadvertent use failed? What additional measures 
can be taken now? 
In answering these questions, this study applies a risk lens, 
based on factoring probability and consequence, applied 
to a set of cases of near nuclear use spanning the Cold War 
to the 21st century. The primary finding of the study is 
that, since the probability of inadvertent nuclear use is not 
zero and is higher than had been widely considered, and 
because the consequences of detonation are so serious, 
the risk associated with nuclear weapons is high. We offer 
explanations for why these risks are higher than previously 
thought and recommendations for mitigating them. 
For as long as nuclear weapons exist, the risk of an 
inadvertent, accidental or deliberate detonation remains. 
Until their elimination, vigilance and prudent decision-
making in nuclear policies are therefore of the utmost 
priority. Responses that policy-makers and the military 
should consider include buying time for decision-making, 
particularly in crises; developing trust and confidence-
building measures; refraining from large-scale military 
exercises during times of heightened tension; involving 
a wider set of decision-makers in times of crisis; and 
improving awareness and training on the effects of nuclear 
weapons. 
Incidents of near nuclear use 
Date Incident States involved Cause
October 1962 Operation Anadyr Soviet Union Miscommunication 
27 October 1962 British nuclear forces during the 
Cuban missile crisis
United Kingdom Conflict escalation 
27 October 1962 Black Saturday United States Conflict escalation and miscommunication
22 November 1962 Penkovsky false warning Soviet Union Espionage
October 1973 1973 Arab–Israeli war Israel Conflict escalation
9 November 1979 NORAD: Exercise tape mistaken  
for reality 
United States Exercise scenario tape causes nuclear alert 
3 June 1980 NORAD: Faulty computer chip United States Faulty computer chip 
25 September 1983 Serpukhov-15 Soviet Union Technical error
7–11 November 1983 Able Archer-83 Soviet Union, United States Misperception of military training exercise
18–21 August 1991 Failed coup Soviet Union Loss of command and control structure
25 January 1995 Black Brant scare Russia Mistaken identity of research rocket launch
May–June 1999 Kargil crisis India, Pakistan Conflict escalation
December 2001–October 2002 Kashmir standoff India, Pakistan Conflict escalation
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1 This is based on the assumption that the correlation between the absence of use and the existence of nuclear weapons is a monocausal relation; it also assumes that the 
period can be considered as peaceful and that its duration is exceptional, all of which has been called into question. Siverson, Randolph M. and Ward, Michael D. (2002), 
‘The Long Peace: A Reconsideration’, International Organization, Vol. 56, No. 3, Summer. Many other factors have arguably come into play and there is a literature 
arguing that peace was achieved in spite of nuclear deterrence rather than thanks to it. This was because of the risky and coercive nature of such a strategy and of its 
adverse effects, including an overconfidence in the possibility of nuclear crisis management. See, among other works, Luard, Evan (1986), War in International Society.  
A Study in International Sociology (I. B. Tauris), p. 396; Mueller, John (1988), ‘The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons. Stability in the Postwar World’, International 
Security, Vol. 13, No. 2, Fall; Vasquez, John ‘The Deterrence Myth: Nuclear Weapons and the Prevention of Nuclear War’, in Kegley, Charles (ed.) (1991), The Long Postwar 
Peace (HarperCollins); Brown, Andrew and Arnold, Lorna (2010), ‘The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence’, International Relations Vol. 24, No. 3; Pinker, Steven (2011), The 
Better Angels of Our Nature. Why Violence Has Declined (Viking), pp. 268–78; Avery, John Scales (2012), ‘Flaws in the Concept of Nuclear Deterrence’, CADMUS, Vol. 1, 
No. 4, April. On the crisis management side, which is particularly relevant to this study, see Lebow, Richard Ned (1987), Nuclear Crisis Management: A Dangerous Illusion 
(Cornell University Press), and George, Alexander (ed.) (1991), Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Westview Press).
2 ‘Nuclear subs collide in Atlantic’, BBC News, 16 February 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7892294.stm; UK Ministry of Defence, ICO CASE REFERENCE 
FS50444068, MOD Ref. D/CIO/3/18/612 (21-12-2011-141621-001), http://nuclearinfo.org/sites/default/files/Submarine%20collision%20FOI%20release%20
270213.pdf. 
3 Hosenball, Mark (2012), ‘Oak Ridge uranium plant shut after protesters breach 4 fences, reach building’, Reuters, 2 August, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/
us-usa-securtity-nuclear-idUSBRE8711LG20120802.
4 Chambonnière, Hervé (2013), ‘Ile Longue. Les incroyables failles dans la sécurité’ [Ile Longue. Incredible security breaches], Le Telegramme de Brest, 11 June, 
http://www.letelegramme.fr/ig/generales/fait-du-jour/ile-longue-des-failles-dans-la-securite-11-06-2013-2132250.php.
5 Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator Annual Report 2012/2013 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212708/dnsr_
annual_report_2012_2013.pdf.
6 See Pelopidas, Benoît (2011), ‘The Oracles of Proliferation: How Experts Maintain a Biased Historical Reading that Limits Policy Innovation’, Nonproliferation Review, 
Vol. 18, No. 1, March; and Pelopidas, Benoît (2013), ‘Innovation in Nuclear Thinking: Incompetent, Dangerous or Futile?’, paper presented at the Program on Science 
and Global Security, Princeton University, 10 April.
Nuclear weapons have not been detonated in violent 
conflict since 1945. The decades since then are commonly 
perceived – particularly in those countries that possess 
nuclear weapons – as an era of successful nuclear non-use 
and a vindication of the framework of nuclear deterrence 
logic.1 In this narrative, the fear of massive retaliation and 
set of behaviours are presented as having prevented the 
use of nuclear weapons. Yet since 1945 there have been 
disturbing near misses in which nuclear weapons were 
nearly used inadvertently. Evidence from many declassified 
documents, testimonies and interviews suggests that the 
world has been lucky given the instances in which nuclear 
weapons were nearly used owing to miscalculation or 
error. A shared belief in nuclear deterrence is not the only 
plausible explanation for our escape from nuclear war; 
rather individual decision-making, often in disobedience 
to protocol and political guidance, has on several occasions 
saved the day. Whereas the popularized image of the 
‘Moscow–Washington hotline’ gives the illusion that vital 
communication in times of crisis is possible, these incidents 
reveal the reality that the possessors of nuclear weapons 
will continue to be distrustful of one another and remain 
reliant on data transmitted by systems that are vulnerable 
to error or misjudgment, particularly when leaders have 
to respond too quickly to be able to make fully informed 
decisions. 
Contemporary scenarios and risks, such as fragmented 
states or a terrorist takeover, present new dangers that 
may benefit from further consideration of incidents when 
nuclear weapons were nearly used in the past, why they 
were not used, and how to avoid such near misses in the 
future. Even in highly stable states, recent examples of poor 
control of nuclear weapons and materials are giving rise to 
concerns about laxity in safety, security, and command and 
control. These include:
• the August 2007 incident when a US Air Force B-52 
bomber was flown from Minot Air Force Base to 
Barksdale Air Force Base, apparently without the pilot 
and crew being aware of the fact that it was armed 
with six nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, and without 
authorization; 
• a collision in February 2009 between the nuclear-
armed UK HMS Vanguard and French Le Triomphant;2 
• the Y-12 nuclear facility break-in by three Plowshares 
protesters in July 2012;3
• recent revelations about security vulnerabilities 
on L’Ile Longue, which hosts France’s four ballistic 
missile submarines;4 and 
• long-term concerns regarding competent personnel 
and strategic organizational change highlighted by 
the 2012–13 report by the Defence Nuclear Safety 
Regulator to the UK Ministry of Defence.5 
These demonstrate that the risks associated with nuclear 
weapons were not only Cold War phenomena, but are still 
happening today. 
In addition, if nuclear weapons continue to be important 
components of military doctrines, the risk of their use, 
whether inadvertent or through misjudgment, will remain. 
Given the humanitarian consequences of a nuclear conflict 
regionally and globally, the risks should be subjected to 
greater analysis and examination than currently exists, 
and developed as a key factor within contemporary 
discussions of nuclear weapons doctrines and postures, and 
in non-proliferation and disarmament policies. These are 
issues and debates that affect all populations, and so such 
debates do not belong only in the possessor states or expert 
communities; rather they require an open airing involving 
as many voices as possible.6 
1. Introduction 
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Introduction 
7 See, for example, Schlosser, Eric (2013), Command and Control: The Damascus Accident and the Illusion of Safety (Allen Lane); Gregory, Sean (1989), The Hidden Costs 
of Deterrence: Nuclear Weapons Accidents (Brassey’s); Sagan, Scott (1993), The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton University 
Press); and Hoffman, David (2010), The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Dangerous Legacy (Anchor Books). Other research includes 
Forden, Geoffrey (2011),‘False Alarms on the Nuclear Front’, PBS, 1 June, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/missileers/falsealarms.html, and Phillips, Alan F. (1998), 
‘20 Mishaps that Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War’, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, January, http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1998/01/00_
phillips_20-mishaps.php.
8 The Damascus Accident in Arkansas is told in detail in Schlosser, Command and Control, pp. 240–42, 390–92, 439–40.
9 Schlosser, Command and Control.
10 Such a list would include 100 kilogrammes of weapons-grade uranium from a nuclear plant in Pennsylvania in the 1960s but also large quantities unaccounted for 
in Japan and Europe since the 1980s, in the United States during the entire Cold War and the challenges of accounting for South Africa’s production of uranium. See 
Sokolski, Henry D., ‘Preface’, in Sokolski, Henry D. and Tertrais, Bruno (eds) (2013), Nuclear Weapons Security Crises: What Does History Teach Us? (US Army War 
College), p. x. 
11 See, for example, Roy, Jules (2002), The Battle of Dien Bien Phu. We are grateful to Eric Schlosser for pointing this out.
Recent research7 has shed light on incidents of near 
nuclear use, largely owing to technical and human errors, 
but what has been less examined is the ‘human judgment 
factor’ in these cases.8 This ‘judgment’ includes the role 
of individual decision-making to break protocol and 
prevent the use of nuclear weapons. Such judgments have 
been made in situations of escalating tensions resulting 
from misunderstanding or lack of communication, and 
by individuals in emotional states of fear and fatigue. 
While safety and security technology and training may be 
improved in response to a recent rise in reports of near 
accidents and sloppy practices, human judgment is more 
difficult to address. So far, the judgments have favoured 
caution, often in violation of protocol. But how sustainable 
is this over time? Does this apply to all countries with 
nuclear weapons? Can more steps be taken to mitigate 
these risks? 
Building on an analysis of cases of near nuclear use and 
recent sloppy practices, this report presents some of the 
risks associated with nuclear weapons that have previously 
been underappreciated and explores their implications 
for contemporary nuclear weapons policies. The report 
addresses the following questions:
• What are key instances of near nuclear use? 
• What led to such incidents and what prevented 
nuclear weapons from being used? 
• What is the significance of nuclear near misses for the 
humanitarian approach to nuclear weapons?
• How might analysis of past instances help us better 
assess contemporary risks? 
• What additional measures can be taken now to 
prevent inadvertent use and ‘sloppy practices’?
Using a risk lens based on factoring probability and 
consequence, the report starts by examining the broader 
consequences of nuclear risk from a humanitarian 
perspective. It then provides a brief summary of the cases 
in chronological order. While little is publicly known 
about incidents involving China or North Korea, these 
two countries are discussed briefly as the lack of known 
incidents should not suggest they are exempt from cases 
of near inadvertent use or nuclear risk. On the contrary, 
persistent opacity should warn against the illusion of 
complete knowledge regarding those risks. 
To be clear, this report does not list or examine nuclear 
weapons accidents or near-accidents, such as those 
highlighted recently by Eric Schlosser.9 It also does not 
capture cases of fissile material accidents or sloppy practices 
leading to fissile material being unaccounted for.10 Instead, 
the report analyses cases in which nuclear weapons use was 
contemplated and nearly occurred owing to misjudgment 
and misperception. It also includes cases of recent ‘sloppy 
practices’ deriving from laxity in safety and security 
procedures. Though these do not necessarily involve the 
near use of nuclear weapons, they do demonstrate that 
nuclear risks have not been limited to the Cold War, that 
nuclear safety organizations often overestimate their 
control, and that there is an enduring need for vigilance in 
the management of nuclear weapons. 
These cases also demonstrate the role of prudent judgment 
in preventing the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Cases 
range from those that occurred during a time of crisis, such 
as the Cuban missile crisis, to ‘bolts from the blue’, such 
as the ‘Black Brant’ incident. While some historians have 
suggested that there was also a nuclear dimension to the 
resolution of the Berlin crisis (1961), the focus on the role 
of human factors such as prudent judgment in preventing 
the use of nuclear weapons means that it is not included 
as a case-study, mainly because of the evidence suggesting 
that the chain of escalation during this crisis was driven 
by mutual strategic ‘hedging’, and not by misperception or 
miscalculation. Similarly, the case of Dien Bien Phu is not 
included, even though it has been suggested the United 
States considered transferring nuclear weapons to the 
French at the time.11
While every attempt has been made to cross-check all 
information and provide multiple sources, owing to the 
sensitive nature of the material many cases were not as 
well documented as would have been ideal. This is largely 
owing to the classification of documents by nuclear 
possessor states for the purposes of protecting nuclear 
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12 For an overview of those problems, see Zegart, Amy B. (2010), ‘“Spytainment”: The Real Influence of Fake Spies’, Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 
Vol. 24, No. 3, and for a specific focus on the nuclear component, Jones, Nate (2013), ‘Countdown to Declassification: Finding Answers to a 1983 Nuclear War Scare’, 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 6.
secrets and national security, but also perhaps to prevent 
embarrassment and/or public criticism. There are security 
apparatuses that have vested interests in protecting such 
information, and those responsible for errors will most 
likely not be willing to expand on them to the public. 
In part the study relies on government statements and 
documents, which should be subjected to a critical 
lens given their vested interest in the events. The latest 
scholarship on the issue shows that time alone will not 
necessarily lead to a greater awareness and prevention 
of sloppy practices, and processes of declassification are 
in no way linear or global. Even after the creation of the 
US National Declassification Center in 2009, for example, 
there is still excessive secrecy in the United States owing 
to competition between agencies and contradictory 
processes of over-classification, declassification and 
reclassification.12 
At the same time, the most forthcoming and transparent 
states are being subjected to increased scrutiny precisely 
as a result of their provision of more information. This may 
appear unfair, and the hope is that all nuclear weapons 
possessors could see the value of transparency and 
accountability measures as part of good and safe practice 
protocols. The intent here is not to suggest these states are 
more risk-prone than others. Indeed, states such as the 
United Kingdom and United States, which provide relatively 
more information about near misses than others, should not 
be punished for this transparency, but rather commended. 
Indeed, one key finding of this report is the need for greater 
transparency and information about such cases because 
there remains much that is simply not publicly known. 
The report concludes with a list of findings and policy 
recommendations. The latter include buying time in nuclear 
decision-making, exploring trust- and confidence-building 
measures, involving a wider set of decision-makers in 
nuclear policy, and increasing training and awareness of 
nuclear weapons effects. 
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13 For a thoughtful consideration of risk see Kaplan, Stanley and Garrick, John B., ‘On the Quantitative Definition of Risk’, Risk Analysis, Vol. I, No. 1, 1981, in which 
the authors state (pp. 11–27): ‘we prefer, to say that “risk is probability and consequence.” In the case of a single scenario the probability times consequence viewpoint 
would equate a low-probability high-damage scenario with a high-probability low-damage scenario – clearly not the same thing at all. In the case of multiple scenarios 
the probability times consequence view would correspond to saying the risk is the expected value of damage, i.e., the mean of the risk curve. We say it is not the mean 
of the curve, but the curve itself which is the risk. A single number is not a big enough concept to communicate the idea of risk. It takes a whole curve. Now the truth is 
that a curve is not a big enough concept either. It takes a whole family of curves to fully communicate the idea of risk.’ 
14 See Lee, Bernice, Preston, Felix and Green, Gemma (2012), Preparing for High-impact, Low-probability Events: Lessons from Eyjafjallajökull, Chatham House.
15 Nicholas Taleb, Nassim (2008), The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (Random House).
16 Kahneman, Daniel (2011), Thinking Fast and Slow (Penguin). 
17 Schlosser, Command and Control, p. 171.
18 Ibid., pp. 171–72.
19 Kristensen, Hans M. and Norris, Robert S. (2013), ‘Global Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1945−2013’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 5.
Risk is the combination of two factors: probability and 
consequence.13 In order to establish the risk that we face, 
it is normally expressed as a formula by multiplying the 
probability that an event will occur by the consequences of 
that event occurring: Risk = Probability x Consequence.
Another way to express this is that risk is the probability 
that a situation will produce specific harms under specified 
conditions. A high risk, for example, may have a low 
probability but a high impact.14 Assessing the risks requires 
an understanding of possible likelihoods and the full range 
of outcomes. Risk cannot be given a single number – rather 
it is generally assessed as low, medium or high through the 
use of a risk matrix, and the probability and consequences 
change over time as new information is garnered and 
understood. For example, as more has been learned 
about the probability that climate change is occurring 
and about its consequences, the more understanding of 
the increased risks has improved. The global financial 
market crash of 2008 also demonstrated the risk of low-
probability, high-impact events. The literature on the 
impact of the highly improbable or ‘black swan’ events – 
those that are almost impossible to predict because they 
are beyond our knowledge and experience – provides 
sombre reading for those addressing the issue of nuclear 
weapons.15
This risk lens raises the question of whether there is an 
acceptable risk level when it comes to nuclear weapons. 
From an outsider perspective, much of what is known 
about the probability and consequences, and hence the 
risks, of a nuclear detonation depends on what is known, 
as well as so-called known unknowns and unknown 
unknowns.16 In terms of probabilities, lack of information 
makes it difficult to provide an accurate estimate of 
all instances when nuclear weapons were nearly used. 
Compared with the airline industry, which employs risk 
awareness based on open information of the in-depth 
analysis of accidents and acts upon the analysis in order 
to restore public confidence, nuclear weapons risk 
assessments are deliberately withheld from the public and 
are not subject to open scrutiny. 
For example, the United States previously attempted to 
explore this question with regard to nuclear weapons. In 
1955, the Army’s Office of Special Weapons Developments 
issued a report titled Acceptable Military Risks from 
Accidental Detonation of Nuclear Weapons, which set 
an acceptable risk level from a nuclear detonation 
equivalent to that of earthquakes and natural disasters in 
the United States over the previous 50 years. The report 
stated that:
According to that formula, the Army suggested that the so-called 
acceptable probability of a hydrogen bomb detonating within the 
United States should be 1 in 100,000 during the course of a year. 
The so-called acceptable risk of an atomic bomb going off was set 
at 1 in 125.17 
In 1957, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project offered 
another set of so-called acceptable probabilities. The odds 
of a hydrogen bomb exploding accidentally during the 
entire lifetime of the weapon should be lower than one in 10 
million, with the lifespan of the weapons assumed to be 10 
years.18 
In the last few years, there is evidence that 
the perceived nuclear risk calculation is 
shifting upwards again.
A nuclear weapon detonation has been considered over 
recent decades to be an event with a low probability 
of occurring but with an extraordinarily large set of 
consequences. For that reason, many analysts have treated 
this as a high risk. During the Cold War, there were periods 
when the probability of use became much higher than 
at other times, such as during times of crisis or proxy 
conventional wars. Over the last 25 years, the risk has 
been perceived as lower because the end of the Cold War 
suggested probabilities of use would be lower and the 
number of warheads has decreased by two-thirds since 
1986.19 However, in the last few years, there is evidence that 
the perceived nuclear risk calculation is shifting upwards 
again. There are several reasons for this shift in risk 
perception. 
First, the number of nuclear weapons possessors has 
increased and newcomers are in regions of high tension, 
notably South and Northeast Asia. Figure 1 captures this 
trend. 
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20 The overall number of nuclear weapons has markedly decreased since the end of the Cold War. The United States and Russia have reduced their stockpiles 
significantly and, of those weapons that remain, most have been taken into storage. By the end of 2012, the United States had about 7,700 nuclear warheads in total, 
Russia about 9,000, France 300, China 240, the United Kingdom 215, India approximately 80–100, Pakistan approximately 90–110 and Israel perhaps 80 (see SIPRI 
Yearbook 2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press)). Nevertheless, the United States and Russia each has about 900 nuclear 
warheads on full alert, i.e. deployed and on delivery vehicles and that can be launched in minutes or hours (Kristensen, Hans M. and McKinzie, Matthew (2012), 
Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons (UNIDIR)). 
21 Eden, Lynn (2004), Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Cornell University Press).
22 Helfand, Ira (2013), Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk?: Global Impacts of Limited Nuclear War on Agriculture, Food Supplies, and Human Nutrition 
(International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War), http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/nuclear-famine-report.pdf; Robock, Alan and Brian Toon, 
Owen (2012), ‘Self-Assured Destruction. The Climate Impact of Nuclear War’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 68, No. 5, and Robock, Alan and Lili, Xia (2013), 
‘Impacts of a Nuclear War in South Asia on Rice Production in Mainland China’, Climatic Change, Vol. 116. 
23 Pelopidas, Benoît (2013), ‘Avoir la bombe, repenser la puissance dans un contexte de vulnérabilité nucléaire globale’ [‘Having the bomb. Rethinking power in a 
context of global nuclear vulnerability’], CERIscope, November, available at http://ceriscope.sciences-po.fr/puissance/content/part1/avoir-la-bombe-repenser-la-
puissance-dans-un-contexte-de-vulnerabilite-nucleaire-globale?page=show [accessed 01/04/2014].
24 On the gap between the framing of nuclear weapons issues in terms of resilience and the provisions for it, with a focus on the British case, see Pelopidas, Benoît and 
Weldes, Jutta, ‘British Nuclear Interests: Security, Resilience and Trident’, in Edmunds, Timothy, Porter, Robin and Gaskarth, Jamie (eds) (forthcoming, 2014), British 
Foreign Policy and the National Interest (Palgrave); International Committee of the Red Cross, note of 3 March 2013, http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/
legal-fact-sheet/03-19-nuclear-weapons-humanitarian-assistance-3-4132.htm.
Figure 1: Number of nuclear weapons possessors –  
trend since 1945
Source: Authors.
Second, nuclear weapons possessor states continue to 
depend on these weapons for their security, despite the end 
of the Cold War. Although the number of nuclear weapons 
and their delivery systems has decreased in four of the five 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear weapon states,20 
nuclear arsenals are increasing in three of the non-NPT 
states and remain significant in military doctrines. 
Third, the threat of nuclear terrorism, which is assessed 
very differently across countries and experts, adds to the 
overall nuclear risk.
Fourth, as this report and others show, it is likely that the 
probability of nuclear use or accident has hitherto been 
underestimated. In the post-Cold War period, the general 
sense was that the risks had decreased in part because the 
probability of deliberate use had decreased dramatically. 
However, the risk of inadvertent use and the risk of accident 
have not been factored in adequately. The risk perceptions 
should be reconsidered in the light of information on near 
misses and near accidents. 
Fifth, the consequences of use are being revised upwards. 
There is an increasing recognition that there would be 
limited or no adequate humanitarian response immediately 
following a nuclear detonation. More specifically, it is now 
well established that estimates of destruction made by 
the US nuclear war planning community underestimated 
the fire effects of nuclear explosions.21 Another body of 
scholarship suggests that the smoke resulting from nuclear 
weapons detonation, even on a limited scale, could block 
sunlight to such an extent that it would place up to two 
billion people at risk of starvation as a result of agricultural 
failure.22 While arguments about the extreme scenario 
of a nuclear winter remain controversial, any nuclear 
explosion would inevitably result in a massive humanitarian 
catastrophe. 
Given the doctrines and targeting policies of nuclear 
possessor states, which do not categorically rule out the 
use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states, 
along with their failure to ratify all treaties establishing 
nuclear weapon free zones that would prohibit the use of 
nuclear weapons in certain regions, the issue of nuclear 
vulnerability is a global problem. No one is exempt from 
it.23 In addition, the immediate consequences of detonation 
and the realization of the inadequacy of the humanitarian 
response are being factored into response plans by large 
international aid and development organizations. For 
example, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) has stated that ‘there is presently no effective 
capacity at the international level to deliver appropriate 
humanitarian assistance to survivors if nuclear weapons 
were ever to be used’.24 
This lack of capacity was demonstrated in the confused 
response to Fukushima, for example. It is important not to 
conflate civilian nuclear emergencies with nuclear weapons 
detonations, however. A nuclear weapon detonation in a 
populated area would be likely to dwarf the challenges 
and effects of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami and 
the Fukushima crisis combined. A study by the UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) on 
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25 UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, ‘Linking Humanitarian and Nuclear Response Systems’, p. 3, https://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/
Linking%20Humanitarian%20and%20Nuclear%20Response%20Systems.pdf [accessed 27/01/14].
26 Lewis, Patricia and Williams, Heather, ‘The Meaning of the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons’, in Borrie, John and Caughley, Tim 
(eds) (2013), Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a Humanitarian Lens (UNIDIR, United Nations Publications). 
27 Second Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons, www.sre.gob.mx/en/index.php/humanimpact-nayarit-2014.
28 Foreign Minister Jalil Jilani is quoted as using this phrase in Kapur, S. Paul (2005), ‘India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War 
Europe’, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall), p. 145.
29 Narang, Vipin (2013), ‘What Does It Take to Deter? Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 3, 
June. On how the nuclear discourse of ‘deterrence’ and ‘non-proliferation’ mixes actual effects with intended effects, see Pelopidas, ‘Innovation in Nuclear Thinking: 
Incompetent, Dangerous or Futile?’.
that ‘according to current terminology and to the way in 
which humanitarian operations are understood by the 
stakeholders, there is little ground to consider major nuclear 
accidents as humanitarian crises in the traditional sense’.25 
A recent international initiative attempts to highlight these 
consequences and subsequent risks. In March 2013, the 
first Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear 
Weapons was hosted by Norway in Oslo, bringing together 
128 states and civil society groups to engage in a facts-
based discussion on how nuclear weapons work, to socialize 
research on the effects of a nuclear detonation, and to 
learn about the impact nuclear weapons have already had 
on humanity through nuclear testing and accidents. The 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons Initiative is part 
of a new discourse of nuclear weapons in a non-traditional 
forum, separate from political debates.26 A second 
conference was hosted by Mexico in early 2014, with 146 
states participating along with many academics and civil 
society representatives.27 
To a certain extent, nuclear deterrence strategies depend 
on risk, unpredictability and extreme consequences. For 
example, Pakistan’s strategic doctrine of engagement with 
India rests on a possibility that limited (conventional) wars 
can ‘get out of hand’.28 Nuclear weapons do not necessarily 
have the intended deterrent effect and for small nuclear 
arsenals the quest for such an effect requires a posture of 
asymmetric escalation that increases the pressure on the 
command and control systems, and could lead to accidental 
launch or misperceptions.29 Given that deterrence is based 
on risk-taking, and nuclear possessor states all practise a 
deterrence policy, it should be expected that a history of 
the nuclear age includes cases of near nuclear use and that 
there will be similar instances in the future. 
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Data and information on near nuclear weapons use 
are scant. Secrecy, classification issues and the desire 
of many nuclear weapons possessors to reassure allies 
and opponents and to protect their public images as 
responsible nuclear powers have resulted in a close hold 
on such information. Thanks to persistent interest and 
dogged research in this area in recent years, however, 
largely among civil society and advocacy organizations 
and journalists, coupled with a move towards 
declassification and freedom of information in some 
countries, a number of cases of near nuclear weapons use 
have come to light. The number of these revealed cases 
is still relatively small. This could be due to a genuine 
lack of serious incidents or to the continuing competing 
challenges of transparency and secrecy in nuclear 
weapons possessor governments. Whatever the reason, 
these cases offer a starting point and contribution to 
research and thinking about nuclear weapons. Table 1 lists 
the cases examined in this report and includes a brief note 
on the cause of each.
Some words of caution are necessary about these case 
studies. First, they do not represent the full set of incidents. 
They are presented here as a demonstration that such events 
have occurred and should be thought about, analysed, 
understood and acted upon. The incidents discussed here 
may represent a comprehensive list or they may be only the 
visible part of a much larger iceberg of events. This may not 
be known for decades to come. 
Second, our interpretations and those of other scholars laid 
out in this report are not the only interpretations applicable 
to the case studies; alternative interpretations are welcome 
as part of an honest effort to understand the true risks 
associated with nuclear weapons. 
Poor practices in nuclear weapons 
management have occurred at all levels 
of decision-making in the past, are still 
happening today and are likely to  
continue in the future.
Third, it is clear from the case studies that military doctrines 
and political systems matter when it comes to nuclear 
weapons decision-making. Therefore one specific example 
in one country does not necessarily imply that such a 
situation could occur in another. 
Fourth, and conversely, just because an incident occurred 
in one country does not mean that other states are 
exempt from similar situations. A touch-and-go decision 
in one country that did not lead to the use of nuclear 
weapons could have resulted – or may yet result – in a 
far worse outcome in another. When it comes to nuclear 
weapons and decision-making in the heat of the moment, 
caution against complacency would seem the prudent 
approach.
Poor practices in nuclear weapons management have 
occurred at all levels of decision-making in the past, are still 
happening today and are likely to continue in the future. 
This chapter demonstrates their ubiquity across time, 
locations and levels of responsibility. 
Table 1: Incidents of near nuclear use 
Date Incident States involved Cause
October 1962 Operation Anadyr Soviet Union Miscommunication 
27 October 1962 British nuclear forces during the 
Cuban missile crisis
United Kingdom Conflict escalation 
27 October 1962 Black Saturday United States Conflict escalation and miscommunication
22 November 1962 Penkovsky false warning Soviet Union Espionage
October 1973 1973 Arab–Israeli war Israel Conflict escalation
9 November 1979 NORAD: Exercise tape mistaken  
for reality 
United States Exercise scenario tape causes nuclear alert 
3 June 1980 NORAD: Faulty computer chip United States Faulty computer chip 
25 September 1983 Serpukhov-15 Soviet Union Technical error
7–11 November 1983 Able Archer-83 Soviet Union, United States Misperception of military training exercise
18–21 August 1991 Failed coup Soviet Union Loss of command and control structure
25 January 1995 Black Brant scare Russia Mistaken identity of research rocket launch
May–June 1999 Kargil crisis India, Pakistan Conflict escalation
December 2001–October 2002 Kashmir standoff India, Pakistan Conflict escalation
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30 Séguéla, Jacques (2006), ‘La clé atomique’ [‘The Atomic Key’], Le Nouvel Observateur, 5–11 January; Gairin, Victoria (2012), ‘Derrière les murs du Château’ [‘Behind 
the Walls of the Castle’], Le Point, 29 March. 
31 David Hackworth summarizes some cases in ‘Hell in a Handbasket’, Maxim, January 2001, http://www.hackworth.com/maxim012001.html.
32 Among many sources on Nixon’s drinking problem during his presidency, see Small, Melvin (2003), The Presidency of Richard Nixon (University Press of Kansas), 
pp. 18, 220; and Hersh, Seymour M. (1982), Kissinger: The Price of Power. Henry Kissinger in the Nixon White House (Faber & Faber), pp. 88, 108–10, 190–91, 396, 513. 
On an episode of heavy drinking while Yeltsin was a guest at Blair House in 1995, see Branch, Taylor (2009), The Clinton Tapes. Wrestling History with the President 
(Simon & Shuster), pp. 198–99. John F. Kennedy’s reliance on painkillers was also a potential cause of concern. The gate logs at the White House suggest that the 
so-called ‘Doctor Feelgood’, i.e. Max Jacobson, visited Kennedy more than thirty times: O’Brien, Michael (2005), John F. Kennedy: A Biography (St Martin’s Press), 
pp. 761–64. See also Dallek, Robert (2002), ‘The Medical Ordeals of Kennedy’, The Atlantic Monthly, December, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/past/docs/
issues/2002/12/dallek.htm.
33 Sagan, Scott and Suri, Jeremy (2003), ‘The Madman Nuclear Alert: Safety, Secrecy and Signalling in October 1969’, International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4, Spring.
34 Nixon, Richard (1980), The Real War (Warner Books), pp. 253–55.
35 Schlosser, Command and Control, p. 261, based on interviews with weapon designer Harold Agnew. ‘A screwdriver was found inside one of the bombs; an Allen 
wrench was somehow left inside another.’
36 Ibid., p. 262.
37 Taubman, Philip (2012), The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and their Quest to Ban the Bomb (Harper & Collins), p. 201. For additional evidence about drug use in the 
US Air Force at the time, see also ‘Eric Schlosser on US nuclear weapons: “People are getting sloppy’’’, The Guardian, 25 October 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/oct/25/eric-schlosser-nuclear-weapons-command-control.
38 Kringlen, Einar, ‘The Myth of Rationality in Situations of Crisis’, in Gromyko, Anatoly A. and Hellman, Martin E. (eds) (1988), Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking 
(Walker and Company), p. 64. More broadly, on this issue, see Abrams, Herbert L. (1991), ‘Human Reliability and Safety in the Handling of Nuclear Weapons’, Science 
and Global Security, No. 2.
39 Pelopidas, Benoit (2013), ‘Why Nuclear Realism is Unrealistic’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 26 September, http://thebulletin.org/why-nuclear-realism-
unrealistic.
In addition to the cases of near inadvertent use based on the 
crucial ‘human judgment factor’, other trends and ‘sloppy 
practices’ are worth mentioning. Failures in oversight 
by heads of state are less often reported, but potentially 
catastrophic. For instance, in May 1981, the newly elected 
president of France, François Mitterrand, accidentally left 
the launch codes given to him by his predecessor at home, 
in the suit he was wearing the day before.30 A retired US 
Army colonel reports that a similar experience happened 
to President Jimmy Carter, whose suit went to the dry 
cleaner.31 
An additional concern is the drinking habits and use 
of psychotropic substances by heads of state with the 
authority to launch a nuclear strike, such as Richard Nixon 
(1968–74) and Boris Yeltsin (1991–99).32 An additional 
risky practice was Nixon’s use of nuclear weapons for 
coercive diplomacy towards the Soviet Union and North 
Vietnam in October 1969.33 A Nixonian attitude towards 
deterrence and unpredictability is cause for concern, as 
exemplified in Nixon’s comment that ‘if the adversary feels 
that you are unpredictable, even rash, he will be deterred 
from pressing you too far. The odds that he will fold 
increase greatly, and the unpredictable president will win 
another hand.’34 
Nuclear safety and security teams and top-level military 
personnel are also occasionally prone to sloppy practices. 
For instance, in the early 1960s, NATO weapons handlers 
pulled the arming wires out of a Mark 7 nuclear warhead 
while they were unloading it from a plane. As Schlosser 
reported:
When the wires were pulled, the arming sequence began – and if 
the X-Unit charged, a Mark 7 could be detonated by its radar, by its 
barometric switches, by its timer or by falling just a few feet from a 
plane and landing on a runway.35 
In another incident, on 16 January 1961, at the Lakenheath 
Air Base in Suffolk, England, when the pilot started the 
engines of his F-100D fighter carrying a Mark 28 hydrogen 
bomb, the underwing fuel tanks were mistakenly jettisoned, 
and ruptured when they hit the runway.36 In February 
1974, US Senator Sam Nunn spent two weeks in Europe 
visiting US NATO bases. He reported that ‘there were 
people guarding nuclear weapons [who] were hooked on 
drugs’.37 Overall, between 1975 and 1977, 120,000 members 
of the US military forces had direct contact with nuclear 
weapons. Over the years, a large number of servicemen 
and servicewomen have been removed from their posts for 
alcohol and drug abuse, and delinquency.38 
Sloppy practices may not always have such benign 
outcomes as in the past, and they increase the likelihood of 
inadvertent use and thus heighten the risks associated with 
nuclear weapons.39 As this discussion and the cases below 
demonstrate, there have been numerous occasions in which 
nuclear weapons use was contemplated and sloppy practices 
or mismanagement endangered the safety and security of 
these weapons. 
Cuban missile crisis cases 
October 1962, Soviet Union, Operation Anadyr
On 1 October 1962, the Soviet Union dispatched a squadron 
of four submarines – B-4, B-36, B-59, and B-130 – on a 
secret mission to the Atlantic Ocean, codenamed Operation 
Anadyr. Each submarine was armed with three 15kt nuclear 
torpedoes. En route from Kola Bay, they received further 
instructions that they would be stationed in the Sargasso Sea 
in order to protect Soviet forces that were to be deployed in 
Mariel, Cuba. They arrived during the week of 22 October, 
the same week that the US naval blockade of Cuba began. 
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40 Captain Ryurik Ketov, in Savranskaya, Svetlana V. (2005), ‘New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, 
No. 2, p. 240.
41 ‘The Recollections of Vadim Orlov (USSR Submarine B-59): We Will Sink Them All, But We Will Not Disgrace Our Navy’, in Mozgovoi, Alexander (2002), ‘The Cuban 
Samba of the Quartet of Foxtrots: Soviet Submarines in the Caribbean Crisis of 1962’ [Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, The National Security Archive], Military 
Parade, n.p, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB75/asw-II-16.pdf.
42 Ibid., n.p.
43 ‘Report: About participation of submarines “B-4,” “B-36,” B-59,” “B-130” of the 69th submarine brigade of the Northern Fleet in the Operation “Anadyr” during the 
period of October-December, 1962’ [Translated by Svetlana Savryanskaya, The National Security Archive, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB399/
docs/Report%20of%20the%20submarine%20mission.pdf.
44 ‘The Recollections of Vadim Orlov’, n.p.
45 Huchthausen, Peter A. (2002), October Fury (John Wiley), p. 209 (n. 8); Scott, Len (2007), The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War: Lessons from History 
(Continuum), pp. 104–05.
All four submarines were authorized to launch a nuclear 
attack independently from central command. The precise 
orders were for the submarine commanders to use their 
nuclear torpedoes in the event of a pressure hull rupture 
caused by the use of depth charges, if the submarine was 
under fire while surfaced, or if ordered to by Moscow.40 
In B-4, B-36 and B-130, the launch of a nuclear torpedo 
could be authorized if there was a consensus between 
each submarine’s political officer and captain that it was 
under serious threat. In B-59, the launch of a nuclear 
torpedo required the consensus of three senior officers 
on board.
The Soviet Union had been notified of the 
United States’ intent to drop practice depth 
charges as part of its blockade around 
Cuba, but this information was not relayed 
to any of the submarine commanders
The Soviet Union had been notified of the United States’ 
intent to drop practice depth charges (PDC) as part of 
its blockade around Cuba, but this information was not 
relayed to any of the submarine commanders. Unaware 
that the depth charges that hit B-59 were PDC intended 
to force the submarine to the surface, Captain Valentin 
Savitsky said ‘[w]e’re going to blast them now! We will die, 
but we will sink them all – we will not disgrace our navy!’41 
It also appears that Savitsky was unable to communicate 
with the Soviet General Staff at the time, and therefore 
was under pressure to retaliate without being able to 
clearly assess the nature and context of the risk that the 
submarine faced: ‘[m]aybe the war has already started up 
there, while we are doing summersaults here’.42 Damage 
was also done to the radio antennas on B-59 and two other 
submarines. A subsequent Soviet report maintained this 
could have been due to the use of live depth charges.43 
But as a result three of the submarines’ radio antennas, 
including those on B-59, could not receive all radio 
communications. Second Captain Vasili Alexandrovich 
Arkhipov was able to intervene and convince Savitsky he 
should await instructions from superiors in Moscow. The 
Commander of Special Assignment Group, Captain V.P. 
Orlov, also suggested that the Deputy Political Officer 
onboard the submarine, Ivan Semenovich Maslennikov, 
had a role in convincing Savitsky to opt for sending an echo 
locator signal, and returning to the surface by 04:00 on 27 
October.44
In a similar situation, the commander of submarine B-130, 
Captain Nikolai Shumkov, ordered torpedoes to be readied 
in an effort to give his crewmen the impression that he was 
ready to launch a nuclear response to US bombardment. 
However, this was primarily because he was concerned that 
the political officer on board would report to superiors any 
reluctance to do so under crisis circumstances.45
October 1962, United States, ‘Black Saturday’
The term ‘Black Saturday’ is commonly used to refer to the 
shooting down of a US U-2 plane over Cuba at the height 
of the Cuban missile crisis. However, in a less well-known 
incident on the same day, a U-2 spy plane was lost over 
Soviet territory. On 27 October 1962 – the penultimate 
day of the crisis – a U-2 spy plane flown by Captain 
Charles Maultsby strayed into Soviet airspace while en 
route to Alaska. Maultsby had been on a mission to obtain 
radioactive air samples from the North Pole resulting 
from a recent Soviet nuclear test. During the mission, the 
aurora borealis made celestial navigation difficult. After 
experiencing communication problems, Maultsby received 
a message over the radio from the air rescue plane near 
Barter Island, northern Alaska that had been assigned to 
Maultsby’s flight. He was instructed to navigate left until 
he could identify Orion. Yet soon afterwards he received 
another call from an unidentified voice instructing him to 
navigate 30 degrees right instead. 
At 07:59 Alaskan time, Maultsby’s plane breached Soviet 
airspace. He continued to receive radio communications 
of an unknown origin instructing him to navigate 35 
degrees further to the right, which would take him deeper 
into Soviet territory. Suspicious, he presented a unique 
operation code to the signalling voice, but received no 
response. Having picked up Russian music over the radio, he 
realized that he was flying over Soviet territory and headed 
towards Alaska. Maultsby began signalling Mayday, and 
anticipating an emergency landing. 
10 | Chatham House
Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy
Cases
46 Dobbs, Michael (2008), One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (Vintage Books), p. 264. Dobbs explains, ‘This was 
standard procedure when the squadron moved to DEFCON-3 [the United States was at DEFCON-2 at the time]. Armed with a nuclear-tipped Falcon air-to-air missile, a 
lone F-102 could wipe out an entire fleet of incoming Soviet bombers. In theory, nuclear weapons could only be used on the authority of the president. In practice, an 
F-102 pilot had the physical ability to fire the nuclear warhead by pushing a few buttons on his control panel. Since he was alone in the cockpit, no one could override 
his decision.’ This finding is consistent with Scott Sagan’s in The Limits of Safety (pp. 136–37): ‘Under normal peacetime conditions, conventionally armed interceptors 
would have been used. But because the Alaskan command was at DEFCON 3, the interceptors at Galena were armed with the nuclear Falcon air-to-air missiles and, 
under existing safety rules, were authorized to carry the weapons in full readiness condition in any “active air defense” mission. […] The F-102A interceptors were 
therefore launched fully armed with nuclear Falcon missiles, and the only nuclear weapons control mechanism remaining was the discipline of the individual pilots in 
the single seat interceptors. The critical decision about whether to use a nuclear weapon was now effectively in the hands of a pilot flying over Alaska.’ 
47 ‘Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy’, Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 [no classification marking]. It is important 
to note that Khrushchev’s letter originally dated the event as occurring on 28 October, and other sources demonstrated similar confusion. However, the incident clearly 
occurred on 27 October as it was referred to in a meeting that morning by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. See the account from the secret meeting in the Cabinet Room 
on 27 October, in Stern, Sheldon M. (2005), The Week the World Stood Still (Stanford University Press), p. 160. 
48 Woolven, Robin (2012), ‘Reflections on memory and Archives: RAF Bomber and Command during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis’, Britain and the World, Vol. 5, No. 1, 
pp. 116–26, p. 117.
49 This increased the number of squadron aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert from 3 to 6, although at least one squadron at RAF Waddington was reported to have 
generated nine Vulcans for QRA on 27 October 1962.
50 Macmillan, Harold (1973), At the End of the Day, 1961–1963 (Macmillan), p. 190.
51 ‘Cuban Missile Crisis’, Bomber County Aviation Resource, http://www.bcar.org.uk/cuban-missile-crisis [Accessed 01/10/13].
52 Twigge, Stephen and Scott, Len (2000), Planning Armageddon: Britain, the United States and the Command of Western Nuclear Forces, 1945–1964 (Routledge), p. 4.
As soon as Soviet military radar was able to detect the U-2 
plane and project that it was headed towards Chukotka 
airbase, MiG fighter planes from bases at Chukotka and 
Anadyr were sent to chase it down. They followed the U-2 
plane for 300 miles until they were forced to refuel. At 
around 09:28, Maultsby turned his systems offline in an 
effort to conserve enough fuel for an emergency landing, 
having less than 15 minutes’ supply left. 
It would take until just after 09:40 Alaskan time for 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara to be informed that 
a U-2 plane had been lost during this incident, with another 
U-2 plane permitted to fly the same course, and on the same 
mission, as Maultsby. The Alaska Air Command scrambled 
two F-102s to find and escort Maultsby; however, they had 
removed their conventional air-to-air missiles and replaced 
them with nuclear-tipped missiles.46 Eventually, Maultsby 
ran out of fuel but was able to safely coast clear of Soviet 
airspace. 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev would later state in a letter to 
President John F. Kennedy that a 
dangerous case occurred on [27] October, when one of your 
reconnaissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka 
Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The 
question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this. What is this: 
A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during 
this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has 
been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding 
American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which 
might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the 
U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are 
maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol.47
October 1962, United Kingdom, bombers placed on alert 
Throughout the Cuban missile crisis, the United Kingdom, 
as one of the three states with operational nuclear 
weapons, was pivotal to a NATO strategy that embraced 
the willingness to use nuclear weapons in response to a 
Soviet attack. From February 1962, as part of the British 
peacetime deterrent, each V-force squadron provided one 
fully armed aircraft and crew at 15 minutes’ readiness to 
scramble to deliver its weapons on pre-planned targets 
beyond the Iron Curtain.48 Throughout the crisis, 59 of 
the 60 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) 
stationed in Britain were put on full alert with this readiness 
state of 15 minutes. Moreover, all V-force aircrafts were fully 
equipped with their nuclear loads and crews were placed on 
heightened readiness levels.49 
On 27 October 1962, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
arranged a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 
Armed Forces. They were advised that the United States 
was planning an invasion of Cuba two days later. The Joint 
Chiefs set out steps that would require approval by an 
emergency cabinet meeting to put the United Kingdom on 
a full war footing. Macmillan made clear, however, that 
any steps must be unobtrusive so as not to heighten Soviet 
alarm, and he refrained from sending aircraft to their 
dispersal bases. Earlier, he had observed that ‘mobilisation 
had sometimes caused war’.50 In order to avoid drawing 
attention to the escalating state of readiness (DEFCON2), 
the warheads for the Thors were dispatched from 
Faldingworth to the Thor sites under cover of darkness. 
Instead of the normally easily recognizable nuclear convoys 
used to transport the weapons, an eyewitness recalls that 
the weapons were instead loaded into the back of normal 
three-tonne trucks and were ‘sent on their way accompanied 
only by a single RAF Policemen and his trusty guard dog’.51
While ministers were kept in the loop regarding the high 
alert posture, only ‘a handful of people outside Bomber 
Command’ were given full details.52 But Sir Kenneth Cross, 
its commander in chief, maintained that the Bomber 
Command was kept at arm’s length from the US Strategic 
Air Command as well as the British Air Ministry and that 
‘[o]nce the Cuban Missile Crisis started there was no one at 
the end of the phone and there was no one at the end of the 
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53 Group Captain Ian Madelin in Curtiss, John, ‘Some Additional Comments on Command and Control during the Cuban Missile Crisis’, in Miller, Roger (ed.) (1995), 
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phone until the crisis was over’.53 One account maintains 
that British ministers were not aware of the decision to 
alert Britain’s Strategic Missile Force.54 According to Lord 
Zuckerman, within the Ministry of Defence no orders 
were given to change Bomber Command’s alert state.55 
Furthermore, senior civilian officials (including the prime 
minister) ‘were not fully cognizant’ of events and ‘Air 
Marshal Cross’s actions are another example of how the 
military commander’s interests in combat readiness can cut 
against civilian authorities’ interests in safety’.56 
Other accounts assert that the Ministry of Defence and 
Bomber Command were in continuous communication 
throughout the crisis. Ian Madelin, former director of the 
Ministry of Defence’s Air Historical Branch, argues that 
Cross 
had already implemented the measures which could be done 
routinely and covertly. Anything beyond that would be overt and 
could be construed as provocative and destabilising […] The steps 
he was taking were quite appropriate and, in retrospect, one would 
not say we should have done anything more or different.57 
Moreover, the declaration of Alert Condition 3 was 
specifically designed to be authorized by the officer in 
charge of Bomber Command without recourse to political 
authority.58 Thus, although there is some evidence to 
suggest that Cross had been badgering the Ministry of 
Defence, the Air Ministry and Whitehall for the previous five 
days to be allowed to bring his command to higher alert, 
there is no indication that such measures were implemented 
against political wishes.59
A second controversy relates to the readiness level of the 
British V-force, which might have gone beyond the Alert 
Condition 3 maintained by official sources. Frontline 
witnesses unanimously recall that the whole V-force, 
including all available fully combat-ready crews across 
the command, was brought to five minutes’ (or cockpit) 
readiness for some hours on the afternoon of 27 October 
1962. They later reverted to 15 minutes’ readiness. Sir 
John Willis, then a flight lieutenant and later air chief 
marshall, revealed the mood of the weekend when stating 
‘[w]e were all accustomed to frequent weapon loading and 
readiness exercises but this was very different – the real 
thing’.60 RAF Officer Robin Woolven recalled: ‘[U]nkown 
for a wider public, UK nuclear deterrent crews had been 
sitting in their aircraft ready to start engines for what 
would have been for many their final mission in a nuclear 
war.’61 It remains unclear why this occurred or why their 
planes then returned to their previous readiness levels the 
same day.62 
November 1962, Soviet Union, the Penkovsky 
false warning 
Soviet intelligence officer Colonel Oleg Penkovsky was 
recruited in 1961 by British and US intelligence as a 
double agent and provided high-value information on 
plans and descriptions of Soviet nuclear launch sites in 
Cuba. However, Penkovsky was under surveillance and 
was arrested on 22 October 1962. He had been given a 
code by which to warn his handlers if a Soviet attack on 
the United States was imminent. He was to call twice, 
one minute apart, and only blow three short breaths each 
time. He made the calls to MI6 Head of Station Gervase 
Cowell, at the UK embassy in Moscow. However, Cowell 
used his judgment and decided not to inform London and 
Washington as he should have done. He judged correctly 
that Penkovsky had been arrested and his codes had been 
broken, and decided not to act.63 The calls also came 
to his CIA handler, however. He did act by sending the 
information on to his superiors, who made further checks 
that resulted in the capture and subsequent expulsion of a 
US diplomat from the Soviet Union.64
1973, Israel, Arab–Israeli war65 
Israel’s official stance of nuclear opacity can be 
characterized in the statement that it will ‘not be the first 
to introduce nuclear weapons to the region’ and therefore 
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Israel neither confirms nor denies its possession of nuclear 
weapons. However, it is widely believed that it does possess 
a nuclear arsenal of at least 80–100 warheads. There are 
no official records or public evidence about Israel’s nuclear 
command-and-control procedures, but interviews with 
figures who previously worked on strategic military issues 
give crucial insights into these procedures and describe 
some incidents in which nuclear weapons use was discussed 
at the highest levels of government.
Israel neither confirms nor denies its 
possession of nuclear weapons.  
However, it is widely believed that it  
does possess a nuclear arsenal of at least 
80–100 warheads.
The first time that Israel considered a ‘nuclear 
demonstration’ was on the eve of the 1967 war when 
it assembled two or three nuclear explosive devices.66 
To this day not much is known about that episode. In 
2001 former Brigadier General Itzhak Yaakov (Yatza) 
was arrested and ultimately tried for revealing state 
secrets that presumably involved that episode.67 It is 
widely believed, however, that the nuclear preparations 
were not made in response to a specific request from the 
political leadership, i.e., Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, but 
rather, as Avner Cohen puts it, ‘because it would have 
been inconceivable [to the project’s senior managers and 
their IDF liaison officers] not to do it and the political 
leadership could not resist it’.68 The strategic justification 
apparently given for that action was that Israel must have 
a response even in cases of most extreme and unlikely 
scenarios, such as an attack by Egyptian missiles with 
chemical weapons. The idea was to create options for a 
‘nuclear demonstration’, not actual use.69 Shimon Peres, at 
the time an opposition leader, proposed in closed circles 
that Israel should conduct a nuclear test to prevent war 
and also to allow it to join the nuclear club. However, 
Peres’ idea was never seriously discussed by the Eshkol 
government.70 
The second episode when Israel considered nuclear use 
was during the early days of the 1973 Yom Kippur war.71 
For decades afterwards there had been rumours that 
Minister of Defence Moshe Dayan asked Prime Minister 
Golda Meir to consider a nuclear demonstration. Only the 
recent testimonies from two identifiable and credible Israeli 
sources, now no longer alive, confirmed those rumours, 
but without providing full details. According to the late 
Arnan ‘Sini’ Azaryahu, an aide to Yisrael Galili (a senior 
adviser to Meir), some of the Israeli leadership considered 
nuclear deployments during the 1973 war. Azaryahu 
relates how Dayan requested that the prime minister 
authorize the head of the nuclear agency, Shalheveth 
Freier, to initiate the preparatory steps for creating 
‘immediate operational options of nuclear demonstration’. 
According to Azarayhu, Meir refused. Azaryahu was of 
the opinion that ‘Dayan wanted to trivialize the issue 
[…] [s]ince he raised his proposal at the very end of the 
meeting as everyone is about to leave [as if] these were 
only [technical] preparations for the sake of readiness’. 
He also suggested that Dayan waited until Chief of Staff 
David ‘Dado’ Elazar had left the meeting before proposing 
the nuclear demonstration option, assuming Elazar would 
have opposed the idea. Following Meir’s rejection of the 
idea, Galili expressed concerns that Dayan might not 
have reported this to Freier, and instead urged Meir to 
contact Freier directly and relay the decision.72 Despite this 
testimony, much of the nuclear dimension of the 1973 war 
remains publicly unknown. 
1979–80, United States, NORAD incidents: 
exercise tape mistaken for reality and faulty 
computer chip
On 9 November 1979, a missile warning system was 
inadvertently fed test scenario data concerning a Soviet 
nuclear attack.73 Only the ability of NORAD (the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command) to access the US Air 
Force’s Ballistic Missile Early-Warning System PAVE PAWS 
radar enabled it to confirm that this alert was false and an 
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exercise tape had been left in the system.74 The incident was 
troubling enough to prompt Senators Gary Hart and Barry 
Goldwater to write a report to the Senate Committee on 
Armed Services, titled Recent False Alerts from the Nation’s 
Missile Attack Warning System. Following the incident, Soviet 
Premier Leonid Brezhnev asked President Carter rhetorically 
in a communiqué, ‘[w]hat kind of mechanism is it which 
allows a possibility of such incidents?’75 In 1980, NORAD 
changed its rules and standards regarding the evidence 
needed to support a launch on warning. 
Yet less than a year later early-warning systems again falsely 
reported a Soviet nuclear strike. At 02:26 on 3 June 1980, 
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski received a 
telephone call from General William Odom informing him 
that the Soviet Union had launched 220 missiles at the 
United States. Upon receiving confirmation of the attack in 
a subsequent phone call, with the amendment that it was in 
fact 2,200 missiles that were headed towards the country, 
Brzezinski prepared to inform President Carter. With only 
a minute until Brzezinski was to notify the president, Odom 
telephoned for a third time to inform Brzezinski that no 
other early-warning systems had detected these Soviet 
missiles. The false alarm was later determined to have been 
caused by a faulty computer chip.76 
September 1983, Soviet Union, Serpukhov-15 
(also known as the ‘early-warning system 
incident’)
On the night of 25 September 1983, Lieutenant Colonel 
Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov covered the shift of a 
supervisor at the Serpukhov-15 control centre for the Soviet 
satellite early-warning system (abbreviated in Russian as 
SRPN). Shortly after midnight, an alert sounded at Petrov’s 
station. Incoming data reported that the United States had 
launched five Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs) at the Soviet Union. Upon checking the system, 
Petrov summarized the situation as follows: ‘Reports kept 
coming in: all is correct; the probability factor is two.’77 
Protocol required Petrov relay information of the attack to 
his superiors immediately – including senior officers of the 
General Staff and Premier Yuri Andropov – as there would 
only be an eight-to-ten-minute window in which the Soviet 
Union could retaliate. 
What stood out to Petrov as unusual was that the United 
States had launched only five missiles – far fewer than 
Soviet strategic doctrine believed was likely as part of a first 
strike. He also had reservations because the system could 
not identify the missiles’ jet-trails, and therefore could not 
confirm their presence. He later explained a possible cause 
of the incident in greater detail: 
The satellite can give false reports if it is at a certain location 
relative to the Earth under specific atmospheric conditions. It can 
mean that the American territory functions as a mirror, reflecting 
the sun’s beams. This is extremely difficult to calculate, since the 
satellite is at least 36,000 kilometres distant from the observation 
post, and it is moving, and so is the Earth, which is not round but 
slightly pear-shaped. This also has to be taken into consideration.78
Petrov ultimately reported the incident as a false alarm to 
his superiors. It would be a further 15–20 minutes until it 
would become apparent whether he had made the right 
decision. As in other cases, there is the possibility that 
another decision-maker higher up the chain of command 
could have come to the same conclusion as Petrov did.79 The 
entire incident played out in secret, and it was only many 
years later that the full details of this incident were made 
public.80 
According to the former head of nuclear command and 
control of the Soviet General Staff, General Valery E. 
Yarynich, such frequent alarms reflected the unreliability of 
Soviet early-warning technology, and there are suggestions 
that false nuclear alarms happened on a frequent basis.81 
November 1983, Soviet Union and United 
States, Able Archer-83
A NATO military exercise, codenamed Able Archer-83, 
took place from 7 to 11 November 1983. It featured a 
run-through of a NATO attack on the Soviet Union using 
nuclear weapons and centred on a simulated exercise 
of command and control. Able Archer-83 followed a 
conventional military exercise codenamed Autumn Forge, 
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which contained a scenario wherein the forces of Warsaw 
Pact states outnumbered those of the United States (19,000) 
and NATO (40,000). Able Archer-83 was therefore intended 
to simulate a nuclear attack aimed at stopping a Soviet 
advance. During the exercise, NATO forces went through all 
alert phases from DEFCON-4 to DEFCON-1. 
Two years earlier, concerns over the threat posed by the 
imminent stationing of US Pershing II missiles in Europe, 
along with heightened geopolitical tensions, had provoked 
a genuine fear among the Soviet leadership of a NATO 
nuclear first strike.82 As a result, they had launched 
Operation Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie (more commonly 
referred to as Operation RYAN83), a large-scale intelligence-
collection operation.84 It began in 1979 with the objective 
of anticipating a US/NATO first strike by observing military 
preparations and identifying the decision to launch.85 One 
such scenario was the possibility that the United States or 
NATO might conceal plans to launch a decapitating first 
strike by holding a military exercise, a concern that became 
particularly salient in Soviet military doctrine.86 
The Able Archer-83 exercise thus occurred at a time when 
relations between the Soviet Union and United States 
had become particularly strained and Soviet intelligence 
activity was at a particularly high level. President Ronald 
Reagan had just publicly launched the Strategic Defence 
Initiative (SDI) and famously labelled the Soviet Union an 
‘evil empire’ in March of the same year. Pershing II missiles 
– by now a major source of Soviet anxiety87 – were also 
scheduled to be deployed in Europe after the conclusion of 
Able Archer-83 on 23 November. In September, Korean Air 
Lines Flight 007 was shot down en route to Seoul by a Soviet 
fighter plane after straying too close to a Soviet missile test 
site. Among the 269 dead was a US congressman, Lawrence 
McDonald, and Reagan later described the incident as an 
‘act of barbarism’.88 Andropov stated on 29 September that 
America was on ‘a militarist course that represents a serious 
threat to peace’, intent on ensuring ‘a dominating position 
in the world for the United States of America without regard 
for the interests of other states and peoples’.89 
The potential for misunderstanding was therefore high 
by the time Able Archer-83 took place. National Security 
Advisor Robert McFarlane later claimed that he ‘had serious 
misgivings about approving the drill as originally planned 
[…] [t]here were concerns that superpower relations were 
too tense. There was a concern with how Moscow would 
perceive such a realistic drill.’90 It had been originally 
planned to include President Reagan in the exercise, 
but these worries led to his exclusion from the scenario. 
Operation RYAN had stipulated that participation of key 
NATO heads of state, as opposed to defence ministers, could 
indicate that an attack was imminent. But although Reagan 
was absent from the exercise, other leaders did participate, 
including the UK prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, and 
the West German chancellor, Helmut Kohl.91 
Able Archer included at least four potential indicators or 
ambiguous signals that could possibly have been reported 
by RYAN and led to misperception. First, the Soviet Union 
could have been alarmed by a 170-flight radio silent airlift 
of 19,000 US soldiers to Europe that occurred during 
Reforger-83, the previous conventional NATO exercise. 
Second, Soviet intelligence could have detected the shift 
of NATO commands to the alternative war headquarters 
that would be used for major military conflict. Third, the 
Soviet secret service could have detected the practice 
of ‘new nuclear weapons release procedures’, including 
consultations with small cells of US Defense Department 
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and UK Ministry of Defence war-gamers. Lastly, there were 
numerous instances when NATO personnel called B-52 
sorties nuclear ‘strikes’ during communications.92 However, 
another intelligence source, Harry Burke, fought to raise 
awareness of these risks in a Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) report, in which he stressed that the Soviet Union 
might interpret the training exercises as a threat.93 
On 5 November, Moscow cabled the KGB London 
residentura with explicit reference to RYAN and called for 
agents to be vigilant for ‘announcements of military alert 
in units and at bases’ and the ‘appearance of new channels 
of communications’,94 both of which were featured in Able 
Archer-83. Between 8 and 9 November, Soviet cables stating 
that an alert had been raised at US bases were sent to the 
KGB’s London residentura.95 The cables speculated that 
the United States was either responding to the bombing of 
a US barracks in Beirut on 23 October or preparing for a 
nuclear strike. There are also indications that the chief of 
the Soviet General Staff, Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, moved 
to a wartime command bunker on 2 November and ordered 
some Soviet forces to move to a state of high alert.96 Soviet 
air forces in Eastern Europe increased their state of alert 
between 8 and 9 November and combat flight operations 
were suspended from 4 to 10 November. An additional 
concern was that Andropov was in hospital on a dialysis 
machine throughout Able Archer. 
Oleg Gordievsky – a double agent working for MI6 – was 
able to inform the United States and NATO allies of these 
Soviet interpretations and actions, largely owing to his 
access to the KGB residentura in London. A former chief 
historian of the CIA has commented that ‘only Gordievsky’s 
timely warnings to the West kept things from getting out 
of hand […] Gordievsky’s information was an epiphany for 
President Reagan, convincing him that the Kremlin indeed 
was fearful of a US surprise nuclear attack’.97 
As the exercise reached its conclusion on 11 November, 
the Soviet Union ceased speculating that the United States 
and NATO had been mobilizing a nuclear attack. Although 
Soviet archives have not released any documents related 
to the reactions of the Politburo or General Staff, there are 
indications that the exercise was taken very seriously as a 
genuine nuclear threat. Reagan reflected in his memoirs 
that
During my first years in Washington, I think many of us in the 
administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, 
considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a 
first strike against them. But the more experience I had with Soviet 
leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began 
to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries 
but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at 
them in a first strike; because of this […] they had aimed a huge 
arsenal of nuclear weapons at us.98 
Initially, the general assessments of US and British 
intelligence stressed that the Soviet Union did not feel 
threatened by US actions. The British Special National 
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) in 1984 stressed that ‘[w]e 
believe strongly those Soviet actions are not inspired by, 
and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of 
imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States’.99 
The official assessments and intelligence releases of the 
United States and the United Kingdom, however, might 
have tried to assuage NATO and European concerns.100 
New archival research has indeed revealed that the State 
Department requested a ‘sanitized version’ of the 1984 SNIE 
to be shared with NATO allies.101 Intelligence staff in the UK 
Ministry of Defence later stated that ‘the Russians appear to 
have reacted in an unprecedented way to the NATO exercise 
Able Archer 83’.102 
Some sources from the Soviet side, however, contend that 
the leadership never concluded an attack was imminent, 
although this remains a point of contention.103 According 
to General Andrian Danilevich, a long-serving General 
Staff officer, ‘in 1983, there was never a ‘‘war scare’’ in 
the headquarters of the General Staff’, where he was 
working at this time. ‘No one’, Danilevich said, ‘believed 
there was an immediate threat of a nuclear strike from the 
United States or NATO.’104 One suggested explanation for 
16 | Chatham House
Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy
Cases
105 There are multiple competing explanations for that. Some academics suggest that intelligence officers deliberately removed information that would have made the 
attack more plausible (see Mastny, Vojtech (2009), ‘How Able Was “Able Archer”? Nuclear Trigger and Intelligence in Perspective’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 11, 
No. 1; Manchanda, Arnav (2009), ‘When Truth is Stranger than Fiction: the Able Archer Incident’, Cold War History, Vol. 9, No. 1; Scott, ‘Intelligence and the Risk of 
Nuclear War’). Others suggest that the fear of a US attack in the Soviet leadership might have led the intelligence community to look for confirmation, i.e. maintaining 
longer the idea of a risk of attack (see Adamsky, ‘The 1983 Crisis’, p. 27).
106 Sokov, Nikolai N., ‘Controlling Soviet/Russian Nuclear Weapons in Times of Instability’, in Sokolski, Henry D. Sokolski and Tertrais, Bruno (eds) (2013), Nuclear Weapons 
Security Crises: What Does History Teach? (Strategic Studies Institute Publications Office), p. 100.
107 Gorbachev claims that he lost control of the suitcase for approximately 73 hours. This does not mean that the members of the coup were in possession of the console 
for the entire time – Sokov claims they were only from 19 August – nor is it unanimously accepted that they could launch a nuclear first strike. However, it is clear that 
they could have authorized a retaliatory strike in case of an attack and the entire Soviet arsenal was put on high alert during that period. See Sokov, ‘Controlling Soviet/
Russian Nuclear Weapons in Times of Instability’, p. 100.
108 Ibid., p. 99.
109 Ibid., pp. 370–71.
110 Quoted in Pry, War Scare, pp. 73–74.
111 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, p. 374.
112 Ibid., p. 374.
113 Ibid., pp. 374–75.
114 Sokov, Nikolai N. (1997), ‘Could Norway Trigger a Nuclear War? Notes on the Russian Command and Control System’, PONARS Policy Memo 24, October, Centre for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute, p. 1.
115 Quoted in Pry, War Scare, p. 236.
this is that the Soviet intelligence services intentionally 
withheld information, knowing it could be interpreted as an 
imminent nuclear threat by Moscow.105 
1991, Soviet Union, failed coup 
From 18 to 21 August 1991, an attempted coup in the 
Soviet Union resulted in President Mikhail Gorbachev 
losing control of his nuclear briefcase for three days after 
it was confiscated by Minister of Defence Dmitry Yazov, 
one of the coup leaders. According to Soviet command 
and control at the time, if the primary system, belonging 
to the president, was rendered incommunicado for 
an extended period, then primary authorization was 
delegated to one of the remaining two cases.106 The two 
other nuclear briefcases were in the possession of leaders 
of the coup.107 
Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Kirillov, the commander of 
the nuclear watch who was with President Gorbachev, 
realized that he was prevented from communicating with 
the outside world, and crucially with Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin and US President George H.W. Bush, by the 
self-proclaimed State Committee for State of Emergency.108 
When Gorbachev picked up the red phone to the strategic 
nuclear forces, it was silent.109 Hence, on 19 August there 
was no communication between the division of General 
Staff that oversees the nuclear system and the nuclear 
suitcase duty officers, in effect cutting off the Soviet nuclear 
forces from their civilian commander. 
During this period, Yazov executed Order 8825, which 
stated that ‘all branches of the USSR Armed Forces on 
Soviet territory shall move to Increased Combat Readiness’, 
described by Deputy Prosecutor General Yevgeniy Lisov as 
a state of ‘readiness for war’. Lisov later suggested that, in 
hindsight, one cannot eliminate the possibility that nuclear 
weapons could theoretically have been used during this 
phase of Increased Combat Readiness without Gorbachev’s 
consent ‘had certain forces shown a greater interest in 
interfering in the situation’.110 
Accounts by the military suggest that the nuclear 
commanders were divided on whether or not to support the 
coup.111 The commanders themselves maintained that there 
was no danger of losing control of nuclear weapons during 
this time. David Hoffmann maintains that it is unlikely that 
the three commanders would have followed orders from the 
‘[c]lownish coup plotters’.112 Verly Yarynich recalls that ‘The 
military understood the danger of rocking the boat in this 
storm, and did everything to prevent the boat from keeling 
over.’113 After the failure of the coup, the nuclear briefcase 
was handed over the President Yeltsin, and command over 
Russia’s nuclear forces returned to normal. 
1995, Russia, Black Brant scare
On 25 January 1995, scientists in Norway launched a Brant 
XII rocket from the Andøya Rocket Range, intended to study 
the aurora borealis over the Svalbard region. The rocket 
rose 930 miles above earth with a trajectory that would 
have led to its landing close to Russian territory. The rocket 
itself was a much larger design than previous versions used 
by Norway, and it also used the initial stage of a retired 
US tactical missile, MGR-1 ‘Honest John’, giving it a much 
higher boost range.114
The Norwegian Foreign Ministry had sent letters on 21 
December 1994 to neighbouring states, including Russia, 
about its intention to launch a Black Brant XII four-stage 
research rocket between 15 January and 10 February 
1995, with the schedule for launch dependent on weather 
conditions. Although Russian General Staff Chief Mikhail 
Kolenikov told the press on 25 January that ‘no precise 
time for the rocket launch was given’,115 the letter itself 
demonstrates that this information was provided, along 
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with coordinates for the launch site and the rocket’s 
predicted landing zone.116 A more likely explanation for the 
subsequent events is that the communiqué was lost and 
thus not relayed to radar operators at the Olenegorsk early-
warning station.117 
With a radar signature strikingly similar to that of a Trident 
II submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), Russia’s 
missile warning system, SRPN, quickly identified the rocket 
as a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile. The former commander 
of Russian Radar Forces, General Anatoly Sokolov, later 
said that ‘the start of a civilian missile and a nuclear missile, 
especially at the initial stage of the flight trajectory, look 
practically the same’.118 
At the time, the prospect of a surprise attack was not 
necessarily discounted. While the trajectory of the rocket 
could have led to its landing near northern Russia, which 
would not be the case if this was a strategic strike, there 
were concerns that it could nevertheless have been an 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack designed to disable 
detection systems and precede a more devastating strike. An 
attack on the Kola peninsula, which housed Russian nuclear 
submarines, was also not ruled out. President Yeltsin was 
notified within minutes of the launch and presented with 
one of three briefcases used to relay the authorization of a 
nuclear launch.119
Yeltsin deliberated over the phone for several minutes 
with General Mikhail Kolesnikov, the second possessor of a 
nuclear briefcase, as they studied the trajectory of the Brant 
rocket until it was clear that it would land beyond Russian 
territory in Norway’s Spitzbergen region. In this case, 
technology and early-warning systems functioned properly 
but it was a case of ‘mistaken identity’.120
May–June 1999, India and Pakistan, Kargil crisis 
The 1999 Kargil crisis, one of the most dangerous incidents 
involving the near use of nuclear weapons since the end of 
the Cold War, needs to be considered in the context of other 
crises in Indo-Pakistani relations. Perhaps most important 
among these was Brasstacks, an Indian military exercise 
that took place in 1986–87 and was the largest in South Asia 
at the time. While there was no explicit threat of nuclear use 
(Pakistan was not yet a declared nuclear state) there was an 
‘indirect nuclear dimension’121 to the crisis, which not only 
changed threat perceptions in India and Pakistan, but also 
prompted the United States to play a more active role in 
conflict resolution in South Asia. The United States would 
play a similar role in the future, and therefore Brassstacks 
also represents an important precedent in external 
mediation.122 
The case of Brasstacks demonstrated 
miscommunication and misperception on 
both sides. India, for example, did not fully 
notify Pakistan of the exercise beforehand.
Operation Brasstacks occurred in four stages in the province 
of Rajasthan and involved 400,000 Indian troops within 100 
miles of the border with Pakistan, which responded with its 
own exercises, Flying Horse and Sledgehammer. The crisis 
reached its height in December 1986 following Pakistani 
troop movements. However, the military leadership spent 
two weeks debating how to respond before passing on news 
of the escalation to newly elected Indian Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi.123 On 18 January 1987, the US ambassador 
intervened by meeting with the Indian minister of state for 
defence and securing an agreement to resolve the crisis, a 
message he subsequently passed to Pakistani officials. Only 
then did India and Pakistan activate the crisis hotline. 
Like Able Archer, the case of Brasstacks demonstrated 
miscommunication and misperception on both sides. 
India, for example, did not fully notify Pakistan of the 
exercise beforehand.124 In addition, Pakistan claims that 
in a meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation on 16–17 November, Gandhi agreed that 
Brasstacks should be reviewed and provided vague 
assurances. However, the exercise continued as planned 
and the situation escalated further, possibly because 
Gandhi knew so little about it.125 
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Leading the operation was Indian Chief of Army Staff 
General K. Sundarji, and there is reason to believe he 
intentionally escalated the crisis in the hope of provoking 
Pakistan into a military confrontation that would allow 
India to take out Pakistan’s burgeoning nuclear weapons 
programme.126 Much of the escalation, therefore, can 
be attributed to miscommunication within the Indian 
government, and possibly also the personal ambition of 
General Sundarji. By December, Gandhi realized the danger 
of further escalation and provided a full briefing on the 
exercise to the media in an effort to be more transparent. 
On the Pakistani side, it was the intelligence service, which, 
rightly or wrongly, interpreted Brasstacks as a test of will 
with the potential for confrontation and chose to reciprocate 
with its own military exercises.127 Shortly after the crisis 
was averted, the nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan acknowledged 
the existence of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal in an interview. 
George Perkovich captures the ‘near miss’ nature of the case, 
pointing out that
[t]he liabilities of this type of decision making are greater in nuclear 
policy, where prime ministers and top scientists tend to exclude 
others from deliberations. This has generally led to cautious 
policies, but at the exceptional moments when major decisions were 
made, as in 1974 […], the lack of analysis and strategy led arguably 
to negative outcomes.128 
Against this background, the Kargil crisis arose out of a 
conventional military conflict between India and Pakistan 
over the disputed territory of Kashmir. In May 1999, 
Pakistani troops and pro-Pakistani militants were spotted 
by Indian intelligence in the Kargil region of Kashmir on 
the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC). The Indian 
Air Force bombed Pakistani bases along the LoC in Kargil. 
The incident soon escalated into a military confrontation 
involving the threat to use nuclear weapons. 
In the midst of the crisis, Pakistan moved its nuclear 
weapons from storage. At the end of May, Shamshad 
Ahmad, Pakistan’s foreign secretary, declared that Pakistan 
would ‘not hesitate to use any weapon in its arsenal to 
protect its territorial integrity’, with regard to the disputed 
Kashmir territory.129 India, in its subsequent report on 
Kargil, referred to Pakistan’s use of ‘veiled nuclear threats’ 
in order to provoke an international response.130
Later accounts of the Kargil conflict indicate that 
Pakistani decision-makers severely miscalculated how 
India might interpret these incursions into Kashmir. In 
particular, they assumed that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, 
recently demonstrated in a series of tests, would allow 
it to assert itself more boldly in any conflict with India. 
Poor intra-government communications on both sides 
meant that ‘India and Pakistan had poor control over 
signaling during the crisis, significantly increasing 
the risk of misperception, miscommunication, and 
escalation’.131
The conflict ended thanks to the successful mediation of US 
President Bill Clinton, who was able to persuade Pakistan’s 
prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, to withdraw his forces from 
the Indian side of the LoC in Kargil. Conflicting reports 
have emerged regarding just how much Sharif knew of 
the Kargil incursion relative to the head of the military, 
General Pervez Musharraf. Bruce Riedel states that Clinton 
explicitly asked Sharif if he was aware of how ‘advanced 
the threat of nuclear war really was’ and whether he knew 
that Pakistan’s military had begun preparing its nuclear 
arsenal.132 Sharif later said that when Clinton informed him 
of this, 
I was taken aback by this revelation because I knew nothing about 
it. The American President further told me during the meeting that 
the nuclear warheads have been moved so that these could be used 
against India. I was asked by Clinton as to why I was unaware of 
these developments despite being the elected chief executive and 
the prime minister of the country. It was a very irresponsible thing 
to do on General Musharraf’s part.133
A minister close to Sharif, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, later 
commented that Pakistan’s army ‘very consciously only 
provided [Sharif] an outline of the exercise in which the 
focus was totally different … [It] did not involve the armed 
forces or crossing the [Line of Control].’134 Musharraf, 
conversely, alleges that Sharif was fully informed about 
the incursion into Kargil.135 Following the Kargil crisis, 
Sharif referred to the issue of Kashmir as a ‘nuclear 
flashpoint’.136
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December 2001–October 2002, India and 
Pakistan 
In 2001 and 2002, India and Pakistan went into a renewed 
cycle of hostility as a result of the unresolved Kashmir 
conflict and additional provocations. The crisis was 
triggered by an allegedly Pakistani terrorist attack on the 
Indian parliament on 13 December 2001.137 Following a 
series of accusations by both sides, India mobilized troops 
a week later to Kashmir and elsewhere along the frontier, 
and Pakistan responded in kind. For 10 months, between 
December 2001 and October 2002, India and Pakistan kept 
one million soldiers in a state of high readiness. 
The first period of antagonism was based on conventional 
threat scenarios. The crisis reached its peak in May 2002, 
however, following an attack by gunmen in Jammu, and 
at this point it took on a nuclear dimension.138 From the 
beginning of the conflict India had rejected the first use 
of nuclear weapons, but President Pervez Musharraf 
of Pakistan refused to do the same and stated that the 
‘possession of nuclear weapons by any state obviously 
implies they will be used under some circumstances’.139 
However, the crisis was a combination of logical 
decision-making and seemingly irrational behaviour 
by decision-makers on both sides, most likely owing to 
misperceptions.140 India assumed that Pakistan would 
not resort to nuclear use if it was involved in a limited 
conventional war, as the United States would intervene 
early before the crisis escalated to that level. India’s defence 
minister maintained that Pakistan would eventually refrain 
from a nuclear strike because a nuclear exchange would 
‘destroy’ Pakistan while India would ‘win’ and lose ‘only 
a part of [its] population’.141 India’s limited conventional 
campaign throughout the crisis does not appear to have 
been entirely logical, however, since it did not seek to 
escalate the conflict. According to Michael Kraig and 
Sumit Ganguly, ‘[t]he line between pin-prick, cross-border 
operations against Pakistan-supported terrorist camps and 
all-out conventional war was increasingly blurred in Indian 
planning as the [2001–02] crisis progressed from January 
onwards’.142 
The conflict was resolved when US Deputy Secretary 
of State Richard Armitage made public a pledge by 
Musharraf to move against specific terrorist groups (such 
as Lashkar-e-Taiba) and seek negotiations with India. 
Moreover, Secretary of State Colin Powell was involved 
in military-to-military talks with the Pakistani side to 
defuse the nuclear dimension of the crisis. ‘All this chatter 
about nuclear weapons is very interesting, but let’s talk 
general-to-general,’ Powell on one occasion maintained 
in a conversation with the Pakistani military leadership. 
‘You know and I know that you can’t possibly use nuclear 
weapons […] It’s really an existential weapon that has not 
been used since 1945. So stop scaring everyone.’143
Both parties again relied on the US capacity to resolve 
the crisis and saw its presence in the region as ‘insurance 
against escalation to war’.144 But as Mario Carranza has 
highlighted, ‘[i]n the next crisis, US diplomacy may fail 
to prevent nuclear first use by Pakistan and/or nuclear 
retaliation by India’.145 
India maintains civilian control over its nuclear weapons, 
routinely separates its warheads and missiles, and has 
an official policy of no first use. Its strategic posture 
evolved significantly as a result of the 1999 and 2002 
incidents. After the 2001–02 crisis, it developed a rapid 
response conventional posture (dubbed the ‘Cold Start’ 
doctrine).146 India’s military doctrine centres on the use 
of conventional military force in order to gain territory as 
quickly as possible, which might be used later as potential 
leverage in demanding concessions from the Pakistani 
government. India particularly relies on a significant 
degree of unpredictability in the deployment of eight 
specialized divisions known as Integrated Battle Groups 
(IBG) – including infantry and artillery units – in Pakistan’s 
territory to strike at its military’s cohesion.147 In response, 
Pakistan has fielded the nuclear-tipped short-range Nasr 
missile, thus introducing tactical nuclear weapons into an 
already charged atmosphere. The 2008 Mumbai terrorist 
attacks risked nuclear escalation through a possible rapid 
conventional response by India and a potential nuclear 
response by Pakistan. 
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Following the crises, retired Pakistani Lieutenant-General 
Khalid Kidwai stated that one of four scenarios that would 
prompt Pakistan to use its nuclear weapons included a 
conventional Indian attack in which significant parts of 
Pakistan’s territory had been occupied, violating what he 
referred to as Pakistan’s ‘space threshold’.148 This ‘space 
threshold’ is undefined, and as such India, on the basis of 
its current military doctrine, could unintentionally trigger 
the use of nuclear weapons through a sudden escalation 
in military confrontation where it pre-emptively seized 
significant portions of Pakistan’s territory as a response 
to a terrorist attack or territorial skirmish.149 A cable 
from US Ambassador to India Tim Roemer, entitled ‘A 
Mixture of Myth and Reality’, expressed doubts that India’s 
conventional force posture would ever be used beyond the 
purpose of deterrence owing to operational and logistical 
complications, and referred to this type of military planning 
as rolling ‘the nuclear dice’.150 
Pakistan’s nuclear command-and-control structure is 
officially divided between three authorities. The first is the 
National Command Authority, which is chaired by the prime 
minister. The second is the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), a 
body comprising government and military representatives set 
up as the result of command-and-control reforms between 
1999 and 2001. The third is Strategic Forces Command, 
comprised of the military.151 The storage status of Pakistan’s 
nuclear weapons during peacetime has not been explicitly 
clarified, but it is widely believed that the SPD exercises 
heightened vigilance against the possibility that they could 
go missing. Reports indicate that Pakistan does separate its 
warheads from its delivery systems, and that the warheads 
themselves are separated by ‘isolating the fissile “core” or 
trigger from the weapon and storing it elsewhere’.152 While 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are therefore not susceptible 
to being used while on a hair-trigger alert, the warhead’s 
components are nevertheless stored at military bases and can 
be put together at short notice. 
The disputed nature of command and control over 
Pakistan’s military raises questions regarding the stability 
of its nuclear forces in a context where conventional 
confrontations can potentially escalate without 
authorization from the civilian leadership.153 
Recent ‘sloppy practice’ 
August 2007, United States, Minot 
On 30 August 2007, six US nuclear-armed cruise missiles 
were missing for 36 hours. They were mistakenly placed 
under the wings of a B-52, and were not guarded according 
to protocol during a subsequent flight from Minot Air Force 
Base in North Dakota to Barksdale, Louisiana. Had the plane 
experienced any problem in flight, the crew would not have 
known to follow the proper emergency procedures with 
nuclear weapons on board.154 This demonstrated negligence 
at multiple levels. First, the original movement plan was 
changed and this change was not reported in the documents 
for internal coordination at Minot. Second, when the 
breakout crew accessed the storage facility, they did not 
properly verify the status of the weapons in the facility, as 
required by established procedure, and failed to note that 
the missiles on one of the pylons still contained nuclear 
warheads. Although procedure requires three subsequent 
verifications (by three different groups) of the payload 
installed in those cruise missiles, this was not followed.155 
After this widely publicized case of sloppy practice,156 US 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Minot to deliver a 
speech emphasizing the need for responsibility in handling 
nuclear weapons. In it, he referred explicitly to this incident: 
The problems were the result of a long-standing slide in the 
Service’s nuclear stewardship. […] For your part, you must never 
take your duties lightly. There is simply no room for error. Yours is 
the most sensitive mission in the entire U.S. military.157 
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This episode reflects the limits of learning, given that similar 
sloppy practices had already been identified on at least four 
occasions in the history of the US air force.158
February 2009, France and United Kingdom,  
HMS Vanguard/FNS Le Triomphant collision 
Given what is currently known about the 2009 HMS 
Vanguard/FNS Le Triomphant collision, the case is not 
necessarily one of sloppy practice, but rather demonstrates 
the risk posed by current attitudes towards intelligence and 
transparency on nuclear weapons issues. At no point does it 
appear nuclear weapons could have been used inadvertently. 
During the night of 3–4 February 2009, the United Kingdom’s 
HMS Vanguard and France’s FNS Le Triomphant, two nuclear-
powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs), 
collided in the Atlantic Ocean. What is known about the 
incident is the outcome of a UK freedom of information 
(FOI) request, investigative journalism and statements from 
government officials. According to the UK government’s 
account of the incident, obtained through the FOI request, 
‘Two submerged SSBNs, one French and the other UK, were 
conducting routine national patrols in the Atlantic Ocean. 
The two submarines came into contact at very low speed. 
Both submarines remained safe and no injuries occurred.’159 
The statement added that ‘[a]t no time was nuclear safety 
compromised and the Strategic Weapon System remained 
inside tolerable limits at all times.’160 The French Ministry of 
Defence initially stated that Le Triomphant, equipped with 16 
ballistic missiles, ‘collided with an immersed object (probably 
a container)’, but later acknowledged that the collision had 
involved another nuclear-armed submarine.161
On 2 April 2009, Secretary of State for Defence Bob Ainsworth 
was asked to list all collisions that involved UK nuclear 
submarines with other vessels, as well as the grounding of 
UK nuclear submarines since 1979.162 Though stating that 
the data on the incidents that might have occurred between 
1979 and 1988 were not held centrally, Ainsworth cited 14 
other incidents that occurred between 1988 and 2008.163 
These included nine instances where nuclear submarines 
were grounded, one incident when a nuclear submarine 
(HMS Tireless) collided with an iceberg, one collision with a 
yacht near the coast of Northern Ireland, and two instances 
when nuclear submarines snagged fishing vessels.164 He 
also reported that since January 1987 there had been 213 
fires designated ‘small scale’, such as those resulting from 
electrical faults, 21 fires designated ‘medium scale’, requiring 
‘significant on-board resources’ to extinguish, and three fires 
that occurred when submarines were docked at naval bases.165
What is perhaps most worrying about this 
incident is the level of heightened secrecy 
between NATO allies concerning the precise 
whereabouts of their nuclear submarines.
The cause of the 2009 collision is yet to be fully explained 
by either government. The official position of the UK 
government was stated in 2010 as being to withhold 
‘all particulars’ of the collision ‘on grounds of national 
security’.166 Yet a comment by French Defence Minister 
Hervé Morin does offer one possible explanation for the 
collision: ‘We face an extremely simple technological 
problem, which is that these submarines are not detectable. 
They make less noise than a shrimp.’167 What is perhaps 
most worrying about this incident is the level of heightened 
secrecy between NATO allies concerning the precise 
whereabouts of their nuclear submarines. A spokesperson 
for the French navy, Jérôme Erulin, stated that ‘France 
does not supply any information regarding the position 
of its nuclear arms or submarines carrying them because 
France considers its nuclear arsenal the most vital element 
in its defense capabilities’.168 The ex-commander of one of 
the UK’s V-class nuclear submarines, Julian Ferguson, has 
also highlighted the difficulty of anticipating the location 
of France’s submarines at the time, since the country was 
outside NATO’s integrated military command structure: 
There is a system for operating areas that are reserved for 
American, British, Norwegian, Dutch and Canadian communities, 
and if you want to go into someone’s area of influence, you tell 
them what you are doing. But if you are not in the NATO military 
structure, you don’t have to do that.169
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2013, United States, cases of misconduct 
In 2013, the US Air Force and Navy dismissed two top-
level officers in charge of nuclear weapons and opened 
investigations for personal misconduct. The first officer, 
Major General Michael Carey, was responsible for all 450 of 
the service’s ICBMs. Two unnamed officials have suggested 
that the investigation was related to alcohol use.170 Possibly 
even more serious, the US Navy suspended Vice Admiral 
Tim Giardana, second in charge of the US strategic 
command, from duty in September, later demoted him from 
three stars to two stars, and opened an investigation for 
having used counterfeit chips in a casino near his base.171 
This occurred after the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom 
Air Force Base in Montana, overseeing one-third of the US 
land-based nuclear arsenal, failed a safety and security 
inspection.172
In April 2013, one officer from the 91st Missile Wing at 
the same air force base in North Dakota was punished 
for sleeping on the job while having the blast door open 
behind him. He was one of two missile officers sanctioned 
in 2013 for such a fault – the other was from Malmstrom 
base173 – and he admitted during questioning by superiors 
to having committed the same fault on previous occasions 
without getting caught.174 Moreover, air force officers told 
the Associated Press that such violations of the safety 
procedures had happened more often than in the two 
documented cases.175 The rule clearly states that the door 
has to remain closed if one of the crew is sleeping, which 
is allowed in the event of 24-hour shifts.176 At Minot, a 
member of the maintenance staff entered the silo and 
caught a deputy crew commander sleeping with the 
door open, and reported this to superiors. The officer 
first denied this, and then said her crew commander had 
encouraged her to lie.177 In May 2013, Minot Air Force Base 
received a ‘D’ for its safety record and 17 officers were 
removed from their capacity as launching officers.178 This 
was in spite of the 2007 incident and Secretary Gates’ 
2008 warning. The air force insisted that the safety of the 
missiles was ultimately not compromised in any of those 
episodes because other safety and security mechanisms 
were in place.
China
There has been no reported incident or case of near 
inadvertent use in China, although questions about 
command and control played an important role during 
the 1969 Sino-Soviet crisis. Lin Bao, Mao Zedong’s heir 
apparent, issued an order placing the military on alert, 
including guidance to the country’s nascent nuclear 
forces. Following the crisis and Lin’s death in 1971, Beijing 
promoted an official account starting that he had acted 
without proper authority, although many modern analysts 
doubt he would have done so without Mao’s approval.179 
On the basis of the risk lens and the importance of 
communication and leadership, even though China has a no 
first use policy, other examples provide a sense of challenges 
and cause for concern, particularly during a time of crisis.180 
For example, on two occasions the United States attempted 
to contact China using the hotline established in 1998, 
and meant to be similar to the US–Soviet/Russia hotline. 
However, following the 1999 US bombing of the Chinese 
embassy in Belgrade and in 2001 when a Chinese fighter 
jet collided with a US spy plane, the United States was 
unable to get through.181 In 2007, the two countries agreed 
to establish another military hotline to prevent future 
miscommunications and promote reciprocal transparency. 
As Secretary Gates stated, ‘We discussed the need to move 
forward and deepen our military-to-military dialogue, 
including that on nuclear policy strategy and doctrine. We 
agreed to enhance military exchanges at all levels.’182
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North Korea 
Of all nuclear possessor states, the least is known about 
North Korea’s command and control, and history of nuclear 
incidents. It is thought to possess enough fissile material 
for approximately eight nuclear weapons183 and to have a 
highly centralized command-and-control system. Much of 
the information about North Korea’s nuclear programme is 
speculation, but what information there is provides some 
insight into the risks of nuclear incidents. Nuclear weapons 
are formally under the control of the National Defence 
Commission, headed by Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, 
but there may be other groups, particularly the military, 
with influence on nuclear weapons command. Were Kim 
to order the launching of nuclear weapons, it would take 
one to two days to arm the weapons, which suggests North 
Korea has ‘followed China’s example’ by storing bombs and 
missiles separately, and that it lacks sophisticated safety 
devices.184 The safety and security of this system are much 
debated: some experts suggest that the highly centralized 
nature of the regime is favourable for nuclear security and 
avoiding a nuclear launch, whereas others suggest Kim 
‘cannot wield nuclear weapons unilaterally’ and would 
be subject to pressure from the military in particular.185 
A recent study offers recommendations based on what is 
known and calls for 
all countries in Northeast Asia [to] work hard at maintaining a 
stable security environment that avoids the dangers of a crisis while 
encouraging North Korea to adopt a nuclear strategy that retains its 
‘no first use’ pledge, a strong command and control system, and a 
stable nuclear weapons posture.186
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Analysis of these cases reveals repeated themes relating 
to why nuclear weapons were not used, as well as helping 
to identify factors that increased the risk of inadvertent 
use. These observations are applicable to contemporary 
nuclear policy and will be explored further in the final 
chapter, which offers policy recommendations. Despite 
the lack of details on many of the cases described (and 
with the possibility that additional cases may yet come 
to light), it can be said with certainty that there was a 
higher than expected probability of nuclear use owing 
to accident, error or misjudgment. The risks associated 
with nuclear weapons remain, the consequences being 
catastrophic. While on some occasions prudent judgment 
saved the day, in others errors of judgment nearly led to an 
extremely costly miscalculation. The findings of this study 
also highlight the importance of adequate decision-making 
time in avoiding nuclear use. Additional findings include, 
at the international level, the importance of context and 
outside meditation; at the national level, effectiveness 
in government communications, and involvement of key 
decision-makers; the limits of learning, particularly given 
the lack of information on these cases; and, at the individual 
level, the decisive role of individuals in following intuition 
and prudent decision-making, often in violation of protocol. 
Influence of political context 
The majority of cases explored here occurred at a time of 
heightened political tensions. These were due to a variety of 
sometimes overlapping factors, including ongoing conflicts 
that had escalated to near nuclear use, a crisis, and/or 
military exercises. During such times, communication 
is often sparse and decision-makers are under extreme 
pressure. Many of these cases demonstrate the importance 
of buying time for decision-making, and the immense 
feeling of anxiety decision-makers experience. Stanislav 
Petrov’s account provides an insight into the moments after 
the alarms went off at the Serpukhov-15 centre in 1983, 
where he and other personnel were in a ‘state of shock’.187 
US Senator Charles Percy, who was present at NORAD 
headquarters at the time of the 1979 incident, later stated: 
At the time we had that false alarm – that must have been a six-
minute period, because it seemed like hours to us – panic broke 
out. It was a very frightening and disconcerting thing. You wonder 
what recommendation they would have made at the end of 
those minutes, until they discovered that it was just an electronic 
problem.188
In the context of long-standing political tensions and the 
risk of crisis escalation, the two cases of Indo-Pakistani 
conflicts and the Arab–Israeli war demonstrate the ongoing 
risk in cases of unresolved conflicts. A similar situation 
could occur on the Korean peninsula, particularly given 
that North Korea has on occasion cut off its military 
hotlines to South Korea.189 It is a reasonable assumption 
that an exercise similar to Able Archer-83, which simulated 
command and control, in the region could be confused with 
an actual attack and provoke a nuclear response. The three 
incidents during the Cuban missile crisis, along with the 
Penkovsky case, which occurred immediately afterwards, 
demonstrate the increased risk during such times of 
extremely heightened tension. The failed coup in the Soviet 
Union, while not an international crisis, had potentially 
serious implications for nuclear decision-making. 
The cases here also suggest that military exercises – 
when conducted at a time of heightened tension or in 
regions prone to conflict – can increase risk, sometimes 
dramatically. While ex-officials and historians dispute 
how close to a nuclear exchange the Able Archer-83 
exercise brought the two superpowers, the incident 
highlights the likelihood of miscommunication during 
a period of heightened political tensions. In this case, 
the decision to carry out a NATO military exercise that 
simulated a coordinated nuclear attack on Warsaw Pact 
states without informing Soviet authorities led to the 
assumption that the latter would not confuse the exercise 
with a real attack. Operation Brasstacks also suggests 
that exercises entailing very realistic simulations are a 
potential source of risk when communication between 
countries is poor. 
Hotlines only work if both sides trust the 
person on the other end to have an interest 
in resolving the crisis and to take the agreed 
measures to reduce tensions.
During all such times, a reliable flow of information is 
essential. Indeed, the cases demonstrate numerous instances 
when the failure to communicate a key piece of information, 
such as details about a missile test, increased the risk of 
escalation and nuclear use. These include Operation Anadyr, 
in which the United States informed the Soviet Union of its 
plans to use PDCs, but this was not communicated to Soviet 
submarines; miscommunication over Able Archer; and the 
lost cable in the case of Black Brant. 
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The success of hotlines is often dependent on the geopolitical 
context.190 They only work if both sides trust the person on 
the other end to have an interest in resolving the crisis and to 
take the agreed measures to reduce tensions. Clearly, hotlines 
also only work if someone picks up the phone to call, and 
someone else is there to answer, but the evidence suggests 
this is not always the case in times of crisis.191 The case of 
the Soviet coup, when Gorbachev did not have access to the 
hotline, along with the recent examples from US–Chinese 
communications, demonstrate that a hotline cannot be 
readily relied upon to resolve communication problems and 
prevent inadvertent escalation, or worse. 
Outside mediation 
Particularly during times of crisis, when risks are high and 
miscommunication and misperceptions are rampant, the 
involvement of an external mediator can reduce tensions 
and prevent further escalation. India’s and Pakistan’s past 
success in resolving crises has been due in part to external 
intervention, which prevented conventional conflicts from 
escalating. For example, Bruce Riedel, an adviser to President 
Bill Clinton at the time of the Kargil incident, implied that 
Prime Minister Sharif was under considerable pressure to 
reach a solution which would allow Pakistan to save face. 
Sharif feared that otherwise ‘fundamentalists would move 
against him and this meeting would be his last with Clinton’.192 
Furthermore, Sharif’s denial that he gave the order to prepare 
Pakistan’s missile forces raised concerns about the nature of 
military and civilian control at the time of the Kargil conflict.193 
It seems that India and Pakistan rely heavily on the diplomatic 
mediation of third-party states in avoiding further escalation. 
Limits of learning 
Lieutenant General James Kowalski, the officer in command 
of all US Air Force nuclear weapons, said in July 2013 that 
‘the greatest risk to my force is an accident. The greatest risk 
to my force is doing something stupid.’194 Commenting on 
this after six years spent investigating the American nuclear 
weapons complex, Eric Schlosser noted that ‘[i]t looks like 
there’s poor morale and poor leadership in the air force 
units responsible for nuclear weapons. People are getting 
sloppy.’195 
This suggests the limits of learning about those issues. 
There are multiple, well-established reasons for those 
limits. At the institutional level, the nuclear weapons 
establishment commonly frames safety in terms of culture 
and, as a consequence, puts the blame and responsibility 
on individuals.196 This prevents institutional learning about 
structural deficiencies. In addition, time alone will not 
necessarily lead to a greater awareness of sloppy practices 
as transparency is competing with memory, and processes 
of declassification are not linear. Cognitive psychology 
shows that the mind reaches conclusions based on known 
knowns, rarely considers known unknowns, and is by 
definition oblivious to unknown unknowns. That leads to 
overconfidence and cases of near misses are forgotten as 
non-events.197
Systemic accidents result from the complexity of nuclear 
weapons systems and are often unique and difficult to 
predict. These incidents will not be identical, which leads 
to the impression that there is nothing to be learned 
from them except our inability to anticipate them. 
Charles Perrow calls these accidents ‘normal accidents’.198 
Accidents caused by the limitations of reliability testing can 
happen more than once. Reliability testing can encourage 
innovation as a consequence of learning, but also presents 
epistemic accidents as another source of unknown 
and points to another limit of learning. John Downer 
summarizes those two types of accidents, normal and 
epistemic, in the following terms: 
If normal accidents are an emergent property of the structure 
of systems, then epistemic accidents are an emergent property, 
a fundamental consequence, of the structure of engineering 
knowledge. They can be defined as those accidents that occur 
because a scientific or technological assumption proves to be 
erroneous, even though there were reasonable and logical reasons 
to hold that assumption before (although not after) the event 
[emphasis in the original].199 
Learning relies on both information and experience. 
As demonstrated by these cases, there is a limit to the 
amount of information available and therefore nuclear 
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education is constrained to the confines of classification 
and cannot always learn from the mistakes of the past. 
This is not to say that all information should be readily 
available to the public, which could present a security risk, 
but rather that greater detail, shared research, scholarship 
and declassification would contribute to developing a more 
thorough understanding of these incidents so that lessons 
learned can be applied to future policies. 
Involvement of key decision-makers 
Decisions about nuclear use in many of these cases came 
down to only a handful of people. Logic suggests that 
decision-making structures are better informed and more 
stable when there are more people involved. While in 
some scenarios this can lead to indecision, in the case of 
nuclear weapons this can be regarded as a benefit in that 
it buys time. In that sense, many of the cases demonstrate 
the risks of excluding key decision-makers. A conflicting 
finding also emerged, however, in that the decision not to 
act and relay information, such as in the case of Petrov, 
can be equally vital in reducing risk. This relates to the 
importance of intuition, which is discussed below in 
greater detail. 
In at least two instances of near inadvertent nuclear use, 
namely NORAD in 1979 and Serpukhov-15, the leaders 
of both the United States and the Soviet Union were 
kept unaware of the incident, which could have led to 
an increased risk of nuclear weapons use. In the NORAD 
case, Brzezinski’s delay in reporting the confirmation of a 
Soviet attack to President Carter by one minute may have 
proved crucial in preventing the situation from escalating. 
Referring to the NORAD incident, Brezhnev stated in a letter 
to Carter that 
[a]ccording to reports the incident was reported neither to you 
nor the secretary of defence, nor to any other responsible officials. 
This only exacerbates the situation. It turns out that the world can 
find itself on the brink of a precipice without the knowledge of the 
President or of other US leaders.200
Petrov’s decision not to report the incident as a false alarm 
in 1983 ran against protocol, which called for supervisors 
to inform the Soviet General Staff as soon as such an 
alert occurred. This was premised on the assumption that 
informing senior leaders of a US attack would have set in 
motion a nuclear retaliation. 
In the case of Able Archer, there is evidence that Rainer 
Rupp, a top secret agent of the East German Stasi, provided 
information on 9 November that the operation was not a 
covert nuclear strike plan.201 There is no available evidence 
of any follow-up from Moscow to Rupp’s telegram of 9 
November, nor is there evidence that the large number of 
Stasi agents in West Germany were mobilized to detect 
and monitor Western preparations for war.202 It appears 
that the ‘unknown Soviet intelligence analysts’ in the KGB 
who received these warnings did not pass them on to the 
Politburo or senior officials in the Defence Ministry that war 
might have been imminent, through either ‘common sense 
or incompetence’.203 
Prudent judgment and intuition can save the day 
As mentioned previously, some sloppy practices have had 
positive consequences. For example, Petrov’s decision to 
report the detected launches as false alarms can be seen 
as negligent, given his acknowledgment that he was not 
certain they were indeed false. However, this decision made 
sure that no nuclear launch caused by a misperception 
could be authorized.204 A significant factor in avoiding an 
unnecessary nuclear exchange, therefore, was Petrov’s 
background as a scientist, and his ability to analyse the data 
in a way that would have been beyond the education or 
training of regular operators. ‘I had a funny feeling in my 
gut […] I didn’t want to make a mistake. I made a decision, 
and that was it,’ Petrov said later in an interview.205
As this case demonstrates, individual decision-making, 
informed as it is by judgment, expertise and intuition, 
can avert nuclear crises. Other cases include Maultsby’s 
performance on ‘Black Saturday’ in recognizing that he had 
strayed into Soviet air space and his ability to navigate out 
of it; Gervase Cowell’s correct impression that Penkovsky’s 
call was a fraud; and the roles of Harry Burke and Oleg 
Gordievsky in flagging the potential risks of Able Archer. 
The role of individual decision-making is particularly 
important in cases of technological failures, incomplete 
information or the misinterpretation of data. For example, 
in the Black Brant case, the radar equipment used to 
mistakenly identify the rocket launch as a Trident missile 
had not been subject to errors or malfunctioning. It was 
rather the interpretation of the radar readings and the 
similarities between the shape and trajectory of the Black 
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Brant rocket that led radar operators to conclude that it was 
a Trident missile in spite of early-warning systems.206 Yet the 
Serpukhok-15 incident indicates that, while protocol demands 
that technicians and early-warning system operators inform 
their political and military superiors of any early warning of 
a nuclear launch, this tendency to view a chain of command 
as an inherent safeguard against inadvertent use ignores 
the subjective, and sometimes erroneous, nature of the data 
at hand, as well as the systemic and political pressure upon 
analysts to assume that the data are authentic. 
In the case of Able Archer, there was ‘a rather stunning array 
of indicators of an increasing aggressiveness in Soviet policy 
and activities’.207 On 2 November, the chief of the Soviet 
General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov, moved to his wartime 
command bunker underneath Moscow, from where he 
ordered heightened alert of some Soviet forces.208 Moreover, 
throughout Able Archer, some Soviet UR-100N (SS-19) 
ICBMs went to a state of combat readiness. Soviet SSBNs 
moved under the cover of the ice caps to avoid detection. 
Finally, 75 Pioneer/SS-20 mobile IRBMs were dispersed 
to pre-selected launch sites around Eastern Europe. Yet it 
remains unclear how these Soviet movements were related 
to Autumn Forge and Able Archer or whether they were just 
regularly scheduled exercises. General Ivan Yesin recalls 
that ‘we knew that NATO were doing an exercise, not really 
preparing for the nuclear blow, although of course we 
couldn’t fully eliminate the possibility that the nuclear strike 
might have been delivered’.209
If good judgment is understood as trained judgment, it is 
not good judgment that prevented nuclear use. Rather, 
it is prudent judgment, which might include disobeying 
previous orders. It is not sheer intuition or any sort of raw 
gut feeling either. Prudent judgment implies recognition 
of the unknown at the time of the decision, and a practical 
form of wisdom that is built on a sense of what is possible.210
Policy implications and recommendations 
Even if the probabilities of the use of nuclear weapons – 
deliberate or inadvertent – are judged to be low, the potential 
consequences are so high that the associated risks will remain 
high – ‘too close for comfort’. Nuclear weapons require 
constant vigilance and caution. Since there are limits to 
technology being able to prevent nuclear weapons accidents 
and inadvertent use, Professor Scott Sagan argues that 
the U.S. defense department should be telling new nuclear states, 
loudly and often, that there are inherent limits to nuclear weapons 
safety. […] however, the U.S. defense department will not do this, 
because this would require acknowledging to others, and itself, 
how dangerous our own nuclear history has been. The important 
and difficult task of persuasion will therefore fall largely upon 
individuals outside the organizations that have managed U.S. 
nuclear weapons.211 
The five NPT nuclear weapon states have been meeting 
regularly to discuss ways forward on nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation. The discussions have tackled issues 
of transparency, definitions, verification and accountability. 
Other more informal meetings have taken place among 
the wider P5 Plus group (the five permanent members 
of the UN Security Council plus India and Pakistan). If 
these meetings continue, they could address issues of risk 
reduction, training in decision-making and judgment, and 
prevention of complacency and sloppy practice. 
The terrible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons 
and the doctrines and postures that govern them have 
been discussed in the First Committee of the UN General 
Assembly, in the NPT conferences and committees and, 
more recently, in the series of international meetings on the 
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that began in Oslo 
in 2013 and in the Open-Ended Working Group on Nuclear 
Disarmament in Geneva.
The risks do not belong solely to the nuclear weapon states 
and other possessors. The use of nuclear weapons would 
affect a great many more people in a large number of 
countries for a long time. In addition to the direct targets 
who would suffer the immediate and overwhelming 
consequences of the blast, heat and prompt radiation, 
other victims further away could be subject to secondary 
fallout radiation. There would be a large number of burned, 
blasted, sick and dying refugees. Depending on the number 
of explosions and their locations, possible changes to the 
climate may also reduce crop production for years, leading 
to increased vulnerability to starvation, particularly in 
already struggling areas. 
The risks of nuclear weapons are thus a problem for all.212 
Issues pertaining to military doctrines and postures, 
deployment, and safe and secure practice need to be 
understood and discussed by all. Leaving the discussion of 
nuclear weapons doctrines to a small elite group of weapons 
possessors is unlikely to provide the full range of solutions 
needed. 
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Historically, the nuclear discourse has centred on bringing 
about the elimination of nuclear weapons as a permanent 
solution to the problem. All states seem agreed on the 
desirability of achieving and maintaining a world without 
nuclear weapons. However, progress has been slow, the 
number of nuclear weapons possessors has risen and the 
risks of use remain. Pending the achievement of a world 
without nuclear weapons, there are practical steps that 
could be taken to reduce the likelihood of inadvertent use. 
Some options for action are presented below that could 
have practical effect and reduce humanity’s reliance on luck 
and prudent judgment. 
In addition to the practical solutions suggested here, it is 
also important to acknowledge an underlying issue: the 
security and political issues behind many of these cases. 
Many of these contextual factors still exist today or else have 
been replaced by equally challenging political disputes. 
These are not likely to be resolved any time soon, and the 
presence of nuclear weapons increases the risks associated 
with these conflicts. This report does not mean to suggest 
a resolution to all these political conflicts, but rather to 
emphasize the importance of knowing more about cases 
of near inadvertent use to improve understanding of their 
causes, and to help mitigate these risks in the future. 
Buy time
In cases of near inadvertent use, time afforded decision-
makers the opportunity to demonstrate prudent judgment, 
resolve misperceptions and receive vital pieces of 
information. Therefore, the response status of nuclear 
weapons needs to be adjusted to allow more time for 
decision-making. This could take multiple forms, such as 
adjusting hair-trigger alerts, retargeting, and reducing force 
levels and roles for nuclear weapons so that accidents or 
near inadvertent use are less likely to occur. 
The United States and Russia have large numbers of 
nuclear weapons ready for rapid response. A reduced alert 
stance could be achieved through a phased approach, with 
some experts proposing a negotiated agreement.213 One 
suggestion has been for all nuclear weapons possessors to 
set default targeting to the closest ocean, as is the case for 
the United States and Russia since the end of the Cold War, 
as a confidence-building measure.214 Another, faster path 
would be to develop simultaneous leaders’ statements, 
similar to the 1991–92 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives on 
tactical nuclear weapons or the 1994 mutual statements 
on detargeting nuclear weapons. The P5 and the P5 Plus 
meetings on nuclear issues could address such approaches, 
share good practices, and develop guidelines and principles 
to reduce the alert levels and increase response times. 
Nuclear possessor states should develop 
doctrines stating that nuclear weapons 
would be used only in response to a nuclear 
attack, and establish reciprocal protocols to 
build confidence in ‘no first use’ policies.
The probabilities of an accident or inadvertent use can be 
shifted by avoiding situations in which nuclear weapons 
use would be considered. This has recently been reflected 
in US nuclear policy, which expressed the desire to reduce 
reliance on nuclear weapons, but more can still be done.215 
Additional steps include reducing force levels, even 
unilaterally, maintaining more weapons in reserve rather 
than forward deployed, and remaining vigilant in the safety 
and security of nuclear weapons (discussed below in more 
detail). 
In addition, nuclear possessor states should develop 
doctrines stating that nuclear weapons would be used only 
in response to a nuclear attack, and establish reciprocal 
protocols to build confidence in ‘no first use’ policies, 
for example by de-mating warheads from missiles, and 
communicating ‘no first use’ policy through nuclear postures 
and military exercises. The trade-offs in this scenario are 
between safety and readiness. 
Trust- and confidence-building measures
Towards the end of the Cold War, there were regular 
meetings of military personnel, leaders, politicians and civil 
society experts to discuss military and nuclear doctrines, 
and to help chart a way forward through a transition period 
that was fraught with potential danger and instability. 
Thanks to the Helsinki Process and the Stockholm Accord, 
confidence-building measures helped to establish trust 
between the old enemies. There remains the need for such 
trust- and confidence-building measures between Russia 
and the United States, as well as in other parts of the world, 
such as in the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. 
Some of this vital work is already taking place through 
Track II meetings and the Nuclear Security Summit process, 
but an increased effort, focusing in particular on the 
humanitarian impact of the use of nuclear weapons, could 
be highly effective.
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Discussion of ‘no first use’ policies and information-sharing 
on nuclear postures would also contribute to trust, along 
with buying time for crisis resolution and decision-making. 
Refrain from large-scale military exercises during 
times of heightened tension
Misunderstandings about military exercises increase the 
risks of miscalculation, escalation and propensity for 
considering nuclear response. In the case of Able Archer, 
the NATO states failed to predict how the exercise would 
be perceived by the Soviet Union, particularly in the 
tense geopolitical climate of 1983. The Soviet Union also 
demonstrated misperceptions, however, and a heightened 
threat perception, as manifested in Operation RYAN and 
sensitivity to any NATO military operations. Similarly, 
though not nuclear in nature, Operation Brasstacks 
demonstrated misunderstanding on the part of India and 
Pakistan. The evidence from the Black Brant incident and 
from Operation Anadyr reinforces this point. Thus there 
needs to be a better awareness of how military exercises 
will be perceived by a variety of actors and to communicate 
beforehand and during the exercise.
Involve a wider set of decision-makers
Because of the high levels of secrecy surrounding 
nuclear weapons issues, the number of people involved 
with decision-making has been small and drawn from 
an elite slice of the societies that are involved. A wider 
group of people – drawn from elected representatives as 
appropriate – could be brought into the nuclear weapons 
decision-making processes in their own right. This group 
of ‘trustees’ or a ‘nuclear jury’ has the potential to be more 
representative of the society – including more women, for 
example – and is likely to result in greater cognitive diversity 
and understanding.
Increase awareness of and training in nuclear 
weapons effects 
In the light of the sloppy practices highlighted above, 
including safety violations and misconduct,216 there is a 
growing concern that the people now in charge of the 
maintenance of nuclear weapons may not share the same 
awareness of the horrific effects of nuclear weapons as their 
predecessors. The end of nuclear testing and achievement 
of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is a very welcome 
step in disarmament and the reduced reliance on nuclear 
weapons in military doctrines. However, anthropological 
research has established that the shift from nuclear testing 
to nuclear testing simulation has removed practitioners 
from the experience of the effects of nuclear explosions. 
In Joseph Masco’s words, this ‘blocks access to any 
visceral understanding of the power of the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal, replacing it with sophisticated material science 
questions and a virtual spectacle, which together offer 
only complexity and aesthetic pleasure’.217 The military 
structures of nuclear weapons possessors have training 
courses in place to address this issue. Considering their 
investment in stockpile stewardship programmes, it is hard 
to imagine that the nuclear weapons possessors have not 
ensured that the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons 
are a vital form of training for all relevant personnel in the 
scientific, military and political realms. Yet in the current 
situation, in which the role of nuclear weapons is unclear to 
many people and younger generations no longer experience 
a daily fear of their effects, new thinking may be required. 
In addition, education in today’s military structures 
incorporates a great deal of emphasis on individual 
responsibility and independent thought. Modules for 
training in good judgment, listening to one’s own intuition 
and learning from the examples outlined in this report 
would be worth developing.
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It will never be possible to quantify exactly how close the world 
has come to the use of nuclear weapons and how probable 
nuclear use will be in the future. Probability is only one part 
of the risk equation. Indeed, for some, the high consequences 
of a nuclear detonation – whether deliberate or inadvertent, 
or based on a true set of facts or on misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation – will always be too high a risk. Perhaps the 
question could be phrased more meaningfully as ‘how close 
is “too close for comfort”?’, along with the obvious corollary: 
‘at what point would the risk be assessed as acceptable or 
comfortable?’ These interconnected questions are important 
for two reasons: the abstract nature of the nuclear threat and 
its devastating consequences are fuelling the temptation to 
ignore it, and the rhetoric of deterrence is often framed as 
defensive and seemingly risk-free.218
Once it is established that the probability of use is not 
zero, the political implications require consideration. 
Overconfidence in knowledge leads to greater vulnerability 
and requires policies of prevention, along with a readiness 
to take responsibility for the possibility of a disaster. Experts 
often forget that unprecedented and unpredictable events 
happen very often. Awareness is not enough since it is well 
established that experts do not always believe in what 
they know, let alone act upon their knowledge. However, 
awareness is a necessary first step for developing prudence.
The United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom 
have the capability to launch a strategic nuclear attack within 
minutes. Nuclear weapons are particularly dangerous in the 
contemporary world order where the logic of and belief in 
nuclear deterrence has been called into serious question by 
historians and military strategists. There are many events that 
demonstrate the fragility of nuclear deterrence, including 
technical malfunctions and miscommunication. Given the 
large number of nuclear weapons in existence, inconsistency 
in nuclear safety cultures and practices across states, and, 
as evidenced by the case studies, the demonstrated risk of 
inadvertent nuclear use, a closer examination of certain 
high-risk areas is warranted. However well thought through, 
decision-making is always vulnerable to lack of information, 
miscommunication and misinterpretation. These risks are 
particularly heightened during times of crisis and in regions 
that are prone to military confrontation.
It is impossible to say whether the risk of near misses has 
increased over time. This is primarily because it is not 
possible to have a complete sense of the number of near 
misses and therefore to determine if and when there was a 
greater concentration of them. While the consequences of 
a nuclear detonation have remained relatively consistent, 
levels of risk probability are difficult to estimate. It took 
decades to learn about the role of misperceptions in the 
Cuban missile crisis, and there is no reason to assume that 
the full picture has been drawn.
However well thought through, decision-
making is always vulnerable to lack of 
information, miscommunication and 
misinterpretation.
This report does not intend to undermine current nuclear 
policies or postures, but rather to suggest that history 
demonstrates there is cause for concern over the inadvertent 
use of nuclear weapons. Given the extreme consequences, 
whatever the probability, this is no small risk. The cases 
presented here are analysed not to encourage alarmist 
responses but in order to promote a fuller discussion, to 
avoid future close calls and, ultimately, to prevent the use of 
nuclear weapons. 
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